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“Earth, who was it who measured and divided you with walls, wire, enclosures?” - Pablo
Neruda
“A specter haunts the world and it is the specter of migration. All the powers of the old world are
allied in a merciless operation against it, but the movement is irresistible… The legal and
documented movements are dwarfed by clandestine migrations: the borders of national
sovereignty are sieves.” – Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire
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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates how the Egyptian migrant subject who chooses to cross the
Mediterranean through irregular means to reach Europe is discursively constructed in Egyptian
media, particularly in the wake of the 2016 Rashid boat sinking. In both official and public
discourse, this highly visible and well-documented accident raised questions on accountability
and the role of the state in this situation. By identifying and analyzing the themes represented
throughout a diverse collected fieldwork corpus of various Egyptian media, statements by public
officials and organizations, newspaper articles and editorials, television talk show programming,
and popular cultural production, this thesis offers a lens to study the dynamics of Egyptian
irregular mobility. This research uses critical discourse analysis to examine the ways in which
these individuals have been represented by hegemonic narratives linking them to the material
conditions of socio-economics and wider securitization policy that shape the production of
knowledge on this issue.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 AIM AND SCOPE
In the past couple of years, footage of overloaded migrants’ boats and tragic death tolls of
drownings at sea have become a reoccurring headline. The phenomenon has grown to the extent
that the Mediterranean, once associated with being a civilization crossroad, has begun to be
associated as “a cemetery for illegal migrants” (Kassar & Dourgnon, 2014, p. 11). Indeed, as De
Genova has demonstrated, “the putative crisis surrounding the influx of migrants and refugees in
Europe- and the spectacle that it generates- has long been nowhere more extravagantly put on
display than in the Mediterranean Sea” (Genova, 2017, p. 3). The Central Mediterranean route to
Italy from either Egypt or Libya has become one of the most popular passageways for those
chasing the dream of a more promising life in Europe. As of 2017, this route has also been
identified as the world’s most fatal migration route accounting for around 14,500 deaths since
2014 (IOM, 2017). Among these individuals risking their lives for hope of a better future in the
north are Egyptians attempting to migrate across the sea from Egypt’s north coast via smuggling
vessels. According to figures by UNHCR, the number of Egyptians arriving in Italy by
smuggling boats has risen from 344 in 2015 to 2,634 in 2016. This was a significant rise in
Egyptians attempting to cross the sea to reach Europe in the short time period of one year.
However, following events like the Rasheed incident in September, irregular outflows from the
Egyptian northern coast dramatically decreased due tightened control and securitization
measures (Sayed, 2017).

This thesis will provide an analysis and discussion of the discourse surrounding unauthorized
migration of Egyptians who attempt leave their country to cross the Mediterranean into Europe
in the local Egyptian context. To understand and identify how the national discourse frames this
issue is key in assessing how the subject of Egyptian irregular migration and the representation
of the migrant in particular is constructed. Through discourse analysis of mediums explained
further below, one can understand how the state relates to its migrants. This thesis studies how
the dynamics of this state-society relationship is reproduced and maintained through discourse.
Studies on how a country’s media covers their own nationals migrating through clandestine
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means are limited. Often studies on media discourse regarding migration are situated from a
perspective of countries of the global north that determine how the immigrant from the global
south coming into the developed receiving country is portrayed, usually as a threat. This research
adds to this limited scholarship in that it approaches a growing current phenomenon in the
context of its own local media and cultural productions.

Notes from the Researcher
As a child of Egyptian migrants in the global North myself, I have always found questions of
mobility and its contradictions - particularly who is “allowed” to be a mobile subject and who is
not- fascinating. The privilege of having a first world passport while most of my relatives did not
was an injustice I felt acutely aware of growing up sparking an interest in the discriminatory
nature of border control and visa regimes. Perhaps I cannot relate directly to the struggles of
migrating irregularly as the subject that this thesis is concerned with is, however as a firstgeneration immigrant, I understand my parent’s story- a common tale of migrant laborers in the
West, in my case, the United States. This is a struggle I intimately connect with as a researcher
and thus, becomes a more personal reason for examining and producing knowledge on this
particular subject in academic scholarship.

Context of Rasheed Incident Coverage

A boat carrying around 600 migrants sunk off the coast of Rashid or Rosetta in Egypt on
September 21st, 2016, killing over 200 people including 43 Egyptians (Ismail, 2016). State
response to the tragedy in terms of search and rescue was virtually non-existent as migrants spent
hours through the night until the afternoon in the water and local fishermen took up the
responsibility of retrieving bodies. The tragic, highly visible and widely documented incident
ignited national debate over the figure of the migrant, how to relate to him, and who to blame for
his death. “Shouldn’t they have spent that money on some beneficial project, instead of riding
the sea?” is a common sentiment expressed in Egyptian talk shows that has permeated among
public discourse. This kind of rhetoric mirrors official discourse as exemplified in President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s speech on September 26th, 2016, five days after the Rashid incident,
declaring, “I want to tell you that any of our youth, to be able to make this trip, have to pay large
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amounts of money that he has to find or borrow. People, people, our country deserves us more.
Our country deserves us more. And, honestly, we are not leaving you alone” (Attalah, 2016).
What drives such sentiments and how do they become so proliferated in society? In the wake of
a deadly tragedy, official and non-official media speech quickly transformed from mourning to
blame. The Egyptian clandestine seeking a better life in Europe suddenly became at worst a
greedy fool who wasted a fortune on a “death trip,” an idiot from the countryside who knows not
the risks involved with such a journey, and a traitor to his homeland. At best, the migrant became
a completely helpless victim to his conditions. What interests are served when such discursive
practices are deployed and in what ways does this discourse adopt wider hegemonic
securitization of migration language?
In my thesis, I aim to examine the discourse of the current “illegal” migration wave in the
Egyptian context and analyze the dynamics that create and sustain the representation of the
Egyptian clandestine. I describe and assess how the image of the Egyptian irregular migrant has
come to be represented in local and national media and popular culture using newspapers,
television talk show programming, and film. How and why this particular image has been
cultivated and sustained is a key notion that this thesis aims to explore. In order to do so,
questions of power relations between the state and the individual, particular individuals with
mobile aspirations, and responsibility toward its citizens are central in explaining the rise of
hegemonic discourse regarding the decision by Egyptians to embark on the dangerous journey
across the Mediterranean. The state’s address and response of this issue draws on securitization
and nationalist discourses. Largely absent from this discourse is the agency and will of the
migrant that elects to journey in search of a better future in Europe as voices of the clandestine
are mostly excluded.

Discourses that shame and blame the victim illuminate dynamics between the state and the
individual. To elaborate, as more Egyptians decide to risk their lives to pursue the dangerous
journey across the sea, often resulting in tragedy, it reflects a certain reality of conditions in the
country and the effect of marginalization of villages in which the rise in migration is witnessed
most clearly. In my thesis I use tools of critical discourse analysis (CDA) to trace how power
relations work to uphold certain narratives on the Egyptian irregular clandestine.
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Nationalist state discourse helps to absolve the state of its accountability toward providing a
livable and instead places the onus and wrongdoing on the individuals who attempt to escape the
country. This thesis examines further the purposes served by the migrant-blaming narratives
which hide failures of the state and its labor market in providing adequate employment and
services to its population, especially in rural areas. Problematizing the various narratives that
frame this issue and contextualizing within the wider post-2011 Egyptian social and political
context, a greater understanding of the dynamics of these relationships between state and society
can be gained. To elaborate, understanding how and why the state discursively engages and
frames the Egyptian irregular migrant practice by examining the rhetoric deployed and situating
it as part of broader historical discourses of nationalism and securitization, both internal and
external, serve as a key lens in understanding how the state relates to its population. In short, the
type of discourses and major narratives identified in this thesis surrounding this issue serve
important purposes in both absolving state accountability toward providing a sustainable living
for its citizen and for maintaining increased securitization and containment of mobility.

Discourse surrounding this issue is important because it crafts a particular reality of how we
come to understand the migrant. Furthermore, reoccurring and wide-reaching dominant
narratives rooted in a securitization discourse encourage and often call for certain policy
considerations. In order to illustrate a wider picture of the Egyptian state’s position toward
individuals attempting to cross the Mediterranean, I highlight evolving legal and securitization
measures taken to address this issue. A common feature of this discourse is the criminalization of
smugglers and brokers involved in this process calling upon increased punishment of those
enabling “death trips.” Egypt’s new anti-smuggling law, which criminalizes people smuggling
for the first time in the history of Egyptian law, will be analyzed in relation to this securitization
discourse. The legal measure, which is an application of the Palermo Protocol 2 on human
trafficking, was drafted by the newly established National Coordinating Committee on
Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM) and was recently approved by the
Egyptian Parliament a few weeks following the Rashid accident. These measures and the
discourse surrounding it work in conversation with and in response to wider pressures from the
EU to combat smuggling and irregular means of movement to Europe.

9

It is important to consider the irregular migration of Egyptians in the context of a postrevolutionary Egypt under a military regime in order to properly situate the current migration
wave. Indeed, the relationship between revolution and emigration in Egypt is not so different. To
elaborate, the “economic (unemployment, underemployment, low wages), political
(authoritarianism, corruption, clientelism) and social (socio-spatial inequalities, patriarchy, high
marriage costs, etc.) dysfunctions that are among the main reasons for emigrating are, at the
same time, the elements that sparked the 25 January 2011 revolution,” as Pagès-El Karoui
explains (2015, p. 1). Egypt is not new to major incidents in the Mediterranean; however, the
conditions of clandestine migration out of the country are changing in light of regional conflict
and domestic economic and political changes. While post-revolutionary Egypt did not become a
conflict and war zone like other nation-states in the region, Egyptian migrants were nonetheless
joining their Syrian and Libyan and African counterparts in droves risking their lives to cross the
Mediterranean. To clarify however, the numbers of Egyptians reaching Europe by unauthorized
means remain far less than the aforementioned nationalities. Egypt is an origin point for
irregular migration to Europe, a key hub for transit migration. However, the route from Egypt to
European shores is not the most popular. Since the 2011 post-Ghaddafi upheaval and the
subsequent power vacuum, Libya has become a more prominent site of transit for irregular
migration as a viable option for clandestine migrants.

1.2 BACKGROUND ON EGYPTIAN MIGRATION
In this section, I will briefly describe some theoretical approaches to studying migration and the
nature and background of Egyptian migration. While irregular migration has recently become a
prominent topic in academic literature, there have been few scholarly studies aimed at
understanding the phenomenon from an Egyptian perspective, where the major waves of
clandestine attempts at migration to Europe from the northern Egyptian coast have been
practiced since the beginning of the 21st century (Zohry, Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe,
2006). I hope that my work can serve as a small contribution to this gap in Egyptian migration
literature. To provide a foundational background to tackle these issues, I will begin by discussing
prevailing literature on migration theory, provide a brief history of migration waves in Egypt,
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refer to contemporary migration policy and border control measures, and briefly define and
problematize what it means to be an “illegal migrant.”

Theories of migration are diverse and impossible to cluster in a well-defined theoretical
paradigm. Although there appears to be a general consensus in the social sciences on the kinds of
questions to ask when approaching international migration, answering these questions varies
widely across the various disciplines that address them. Migration research is intrinsically
interdisciplinary involving sociology, political science, law, economics, demography, geography,
psychology and cultural studies (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000). Older literature on migration such
as Ravenstein’s “laws of migration” assumes that population growth has a direct correlation with
the propensity to migrate (1885). The neoclassical tradition of economic migration theory
focuses mainly on wage differentials between states mediated by supply and demand. This
theory identifies migration as an individual decision to maximize incomes. New economy of
migration theory, on the other hand, considers the wide variety of markets, not just limiting it to
workforce, and regards migration as a family decision. This theoretical model arose in response
to neoclassical theory, stipulating that wage differentials is not a necessary condition taken into
account when people decide to migrate (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Meanwhile, dual labor market
theory links migration to the structural conditions of modern industrial economies (Piore, 1980).
Another approach to studying migration is called world systems theory which grounds the
process as a natural consequence of economic globalization and market penetration across
nation-state boundaries (Wallerstein, 1974). Scholars have sometimes employed globalization
itself as a thesis to understanding migration in less developed countries. Leila Simone Talani
adopts a paradigm that suggests that the new global division of labor, a consequence of the
restructuring created by globalization, increases the marginalization of some countries, in her
case Egypt, resulting in an outflow of permanent labor migrants to the developed world (2009).
In a famous study from 1936 on the Egyptian population, it was stated that “Egyptians have the
reputation of preferring their own soil. Few ever leave except to study or travel; and they always
return… Egyptians do not emigrate” (Cleland, 1936). Over eighty years, the dynamics of
Egyptian migration, and the means, motivations, and trends of its processes have dramatically
evolved.
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Egyptians, specifically, began to migrate internationally out of the Arab region from the
beginning of the 1960s due to various political, economic, and social developments (Zohry,
Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe, 2006). Scholars have identified five major phases in
Egyptian migration in the evolution of migratory flows since the 1952 revolution. In the early
phase of migration, that is before 1974, Egyptian migrants were very small in number and most
were highly educated, upper class Egyptians escaping the consequences of the revolution and the
social reconstruction associated with it (Talani, 2009). During the 70s, Egyptian temporary
migration expanded significantly to Arab oil-producing countries that desperately needed
workers for development. According to Sell, 1973 marked a watershed moment in contemporary
Egyptian migration due to a number of different changes affecting migration dynamics (Sell,
1987). First, Egypt’s war with Israel created internal displacement of civilians. Meanwhile,
Sadat’s Open Door policies paired with the end of heavy legislative restrictions facilitated
emigration. Most importantly, this expansion phase was driven largely by the first oil shock
which stimulated migration to oil producing Arab states experiencing job shortages. From 1984
to 1988, Egyptian migration to the Arab world contracted and by the end of the 80s through the
early 90s, Egypt experience significant flow of return migrants from the Gulf (Zohry & HarrellBond, 2003). From around 1992 onward, the most distinctive characteristic of the development
of Egyptian migration is the increase of permanent migration to more developed countries
specifically Europe. According to figures from the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and
Emigration, the number of permanent migrants to developed countries increased from 1990 to
1998 on average by 83 percent while migration to Europe increased by about 125 percent (Zohry
& Harrell-Bond, 2003).

Since the mid-2000s, the country has developed into a main transit country for irregular migrants
(De Haas, 2008). While scholarship on the growing role of Egypt as a hub for regional migration
has increased, literature on the nature of irregular migrants in Egypt specifically is limited. This
may be because the criminal character of trafficking and smuggling and the inaccessibility to the
areas where such migration takes place makes it difficult to conduct independent research.
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Irregular Migration: Approaches to Understanding
Studying specifically irregular migration proves to be a challenging endeavor due to the
difficulty in acquiring data for an informal process. Indeed, the field suffers from not only a lack
of adequate empirical data but additionally from “endemic undertheorizing” (Cvajner &
Sciortino, 2010). Often in scholarship, irregular migration is presented and perceived as a
“problem” and corresponding research serves to create “solutions” for it. Still, some scholars
have attempted to create theoretical frameworks aimed at understanding the clandestine
migration (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008). One can trace the longstanding phenomenon of illegal
migration to the rise of the nation state in the 19th century (Zohry, 2011). Geographical barriers
were replaced by political borders and thus, the determination of who is allowed in and out of
these boundaries. The rise of the welfare state in the West accompanied by the introduction of
visa systems and border control along with economic marginalization of the global south have
increased attempts to overcome such barriers.

In the face of the militarization of national and regional borders, immigrants are forced to take
ever more dangerous routes to reach developed countries. One cannot discuss the nature of the
migrant without addressing citizenship as a tool for governance. De Genova notes that the
securitization of migration is in fact “inextricable from a concomitant securitization of
citizenship itself” (De Genova, 2007, p. 440). Tyler argues that citizenship has become “a vast
and proliferating bureaucracy from which flow categories of people marginalized by, excluded
or disqualified from citizenship and the rights which flow from this status” (2010, p. 70). Thus,
citizenship becomes an instrument of exclusion that works to allow the subjugation and abjection
of those that fall out its bounds or the “illegal” population through immigration controls.
Securitization of migration takes various forms on different levels including “the reduction of
legal channels for migration, the proliferation of legislation to limit, hierarchize and scale
citizenship, the criminalization of ‘undesirable’ migrants, the emergence of a global business in
immigrant prisons and the normalization of detention and deportation” (Tyler & Marciniak ,
2014, p. 3). Meanwhile, a “liberal paradox” becomes apparent and complicated as international
borders open to flows of capital, but simultaneously remain largely closed legally to individuals
from the Global South. This paradoxically creates a migratory pull fueled by the demand for
cheap unregulated migrant labor in the Global North (De Haas, 2008). The unjust border policing
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and discriminatory immigration control policies of Fortress Europe fueled by securitization
agendas force economic migrants and those seeking refuge to risk their lives through dangerous
means that often expose the most vulnerable of society to violence of various forms. Identifying
the exclusionary legal and political frameworks that effectively facilitate irregular modes of
migration to the Global North is crucial for establishing a necessary contextual understanding of
the very heart of the issue. Papademetriou identifies four common forms of illegal migration:
unauthorized entry, fraudulent entry in terms of false documents, visa overstaying, and violation
of the terms and conditions of a visa (2005).

Ayman Zohry, an expert on Egyptian migration, proposes a theoretical framework for
approaching illegal migration that seems to be most appropriate to employ in this thesis. The
model considers three levels of analysis; the macro level, the meso level, and the micro level.
The macro level should highlight the political framework in both countries of origin and
destination; the meso level should include analyses on the analysis on migration networks; and
the micro level analysis should investigate factors related to the socio-demographic framework in
the country of origin on the individual level of migrants (Zohry, 2011).
Characteristics of Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe
One consequence of more restrictive migration policy adopted by the EU such as the Schengen
agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty, which imposed a system of requiring a visa, strict
border surveillance, and imposing a selective ceiling for work permits, is an increase of irregular
migration and smuggling networks, especially through Mediterranean routes. Figures of irregular
migration of Egyptians to Europe vary widely due to the challenges in obtaining this kind of
data. However, some characteristics are well-known, such as the fact the Italy experiences the
highest inflow of Egyptians migrants, due to its geographical proximity to Egypt and ease of
traveling to Libya where many boat journeys start (Roman, 2008). According to Talani, the
majority of Egyptians entering the EU are undocumented (Talani, 2009). Zohry notes that the
current stream of Egyptian irregular migrants to Europe started in the beginning of the 21st
century when massive numbers of fresh graduates and low-educated unemployed youth started to
make their way to Europe through the Mediterranean via Libya or by over staying tourist
Schengen visas (Zohry, 2006). Egyptians crossing the Mediterranean often come from a lower
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socio-economic class. Migration of this sort has increased as employment opportunities in the
Arab Gulf countries decrease for Egyptians due to the high amount of incoming South East
Asian workers in these countries whose labors these states exploit cheaply.

A field study conducted by Zohry explored the dynamics of Egyptian irregular migration of eight
governorates that are known for sending high numbers of irregular migrants to mainly Italy and
France (Zohry, 2006). This survey clarified several aspects of socio-political and economic push
factors and characteristics of this type of migration by interviewing the segment of population
(young males between 18 and 40 years old) that forms the pool from which both irregular and
regular migrants primarily come from. His study found that the main push factor behind
migration based on his fieldwork interviews is the lack of employment job opportunities in
Egypt, especially among fresh graduates and the low wages and salaries in their home country.
Apart from geographical proximity and structures that facilitated mobility to Italy, established
social networks of relatives or acquaintances provided a key pull factor for migrants’ decision to
emigrate. While the legal framework for migration of Egyptians to the Arab Gulf countries and
that of migration to Europe is quite different, Zohry suggests that Egyptian migration to Europe
is in fact a reproduction of the pattern of Egyptian migration to GCC states in that young males
migrate to accumulate financial goals and then return to Egypt.

Several scholars have detected a strong pattern of migrants that leave Egypt plan to return to
their home country after saving money from labor. According to the population sampled in
Zohry’s study, the vast majority of the men interviewed intended to return to Egypt after a
temporary stay in the countries of destination. Other studies that included interviews with
Egyptian migrants in Italy by researcher Hend Hafez (2010)and Roman (2008) also strongly
support that the intention of these migrants is to return home to Egypt after accumulating some
savings. In migration studies, this scheme is often referred to as temporary migration. Enacting
legal frameworks and bilateral agreements between Italy and Egypt that support and facilitate
this kind of migration is often called for in literature on Egyptian irregular migration to Italy (See
Fargues, 2008). According to interviews of Egyptian and Italian officials and Egyptian
unaccompanied minors in Italy, Hafez describes:
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“As evidenced during all the interviews held both in Italy and in Egypt with Egyptian
migrants, minors and adults, circular migration would fulfill their main requirements for
staying in Italy. During all interviews, the most important goal after making money was
that of receiving proper documents, ―papers, that would allow them to travel back and
forth between Egypt and Italy. Repaying the debt incurred by the expenses of the journey
and financially supporting the family were the priorities identified. Once that was
accomplished, the goal became one of finding a way to legitimize their stay in Italy in
order to continue providing for their families by traveling back and forth legitimately for
employment” (Hafez, 2010, p. 8)
Arab Spring and Migration
When it comes to the Middle East, large scale emigration from Mediterranean Arab countries
began four to five decades ago (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). Despite European fears that
revolutions and conflict across the Middle East in recent years would ignite mass population
movement to the North, several studies have indicated that rates of emigration following the
Arab Spring have not significantly increased (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012; Awad, 2013). While
Arab revolts did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, conflict in Libya
and Syria resulted in considerable population displacement (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). What
has changed due to the political upheavals is the modes and routes of population movement,
specifically that of irregular migration. Studies suggest that revolution as a structural change did
not spark migration, but rather the opportunities associated with it, such as decreased border
control and disorganized policing, allowed for increased irregular migration and marked a
change in the modes of irregular border crossing into Europe via boat smuggling. Studies
conducted during this period found that revolutions “rerouted existing flows of irregular
migration more than stimulated new ones” (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). While this scholarship
attempts to answer key questions regarding rates of illegal migration and the Arab Spring, the
work was conducted only one year after the uprisings. Now, six years later, dynamics of
migration spurned by conflict have changed. In Egypt, specifically, political and economic
turmoil are related to the rise in irregular migration in ways that this thesis explores.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research project draws upon a diverse body of literature due to the nature of my project. In
this section I first provide a brief introduction of literature on critical discourse analysis (CDA),
16

which I apply as a theoretical framework to conduct my research on my fieldwork corpus of
media production collected on the Egyptian irregular migrant. Next, I examine scholarship on
migration discourse that this thesis will build upon.

Theoretical Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis
Choosing language, both written text and spoken, as a lens of analysis for social research has a
long history in the social sciences. Literature on discourse analysis as a method of research in the
social sciences is abundant. There are many different theoretical strands in discourse analysis and
the term “discourse” itself has been used and defined several various ways. In this section, I
highlight some of the ideas advanced by three major scholars of discourse analysis, Norman
Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Michel Foucault, that I use in combination to analyze the
discourse of the local irregular migrant in Egypt.
This thesis employs Fairclough’s critical realist approach that assumes that the social world is
partly constructed by human action, that is to say that there is a social reality that is discursively
constructed (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4). Language as an access to understanding reality is in line
with broader post-structuralist theory. How semiotics, words, metaphors are used and how
various phenomena in society are categorized are critical in shaping thoughts and behavior. We
can understand discourse as practices, interpretations and representations that form different
‘regimes of truth,’ that are presented as specific ‘facts’ (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p.
65). Worldviews are constructed through use of language which also creates the actual social
world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). These are the assumptions that frame the basis of my
analysis of discourse research.
Fairclough suggests the role of language and discourse is “an irreducible part of social life,
dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research
always has to take account of language” (2003, p. 11). This describes the important relational
characteristic of discourse, carrying both internal and external relations with non-discursive
objects. CDA then is concerned not with the discourse “in itself”, but rather it is an analysis of
“dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as
analysis of the ‘internal relations’ of discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4) This means that
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discourse should not be understood as an independent force but rather as a set of relations; in this
sense, CDA is an analysis of social relations within and outside of discourse (Fairclough, 2010,
p. 3).

Questions of power and ideology are key central elements in critical discourse analysis.
Fairclough, like Foucault, views power as a productive force that produces our social sphere and
social relations, what gets to be included and excluded in them. Therefore, power is both a
producing and limiting force (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Power is capillary in nature, a force
not just exercised by agents over passive subjects but as something that is spread across social
practices, contributing to knowledge. CDA assumes social constructionist ontology in that it
accepts the role of language and social interaction in the production of power relations. In this
sense, language use in speech and writing create meaning in the social process; discourse then
becomes a ‘social practice’ (Fairclough, 2010). By “describing discourse as social practice
implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation,
institution and social structure that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also
shapes them” (Wodak, 1996, p. 15). Fairclough adopts the concept of semiosis, so that text being
analyzed includes not only the written or linguistic communication but other forms of
representing the world, for example visual communication. Discourse in this sense becomes a
broader way of constructing perspectives of different social actors. To put it schematically,
Fairclough describes that semiosis, “an element of the social at all levels,” can be organized as
the following (2003, p. 24)
“Social structures: languages
Social practices: orders of discourse
Social events: texts”
Discourse then, becomes part of the dialectical elements of social practice which can be put into
practice by enacting or materializing them. For Fairclough, texts then are the semiotic dimension
of events that we can refer to in order to identify and relate to differing discourses and ideologies
(Tenorio, 2011). This is to say that it is critical to look beyond the text alone and to engage
different types of discourse placing them in a socio-political context in order to understand its
dynamics and consequences. CDA’s ideological considerations are a key component in what
makes this type of analysis critical. Understanding, identifying, and assessing the ideological
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effects of discourse or the ways in which discourse creates and reproduces unequal power
relations between various social groups such as class, gender, ethnic minorities and majority, etc.
an important task of this type of analysis. According to Fairclough, discourse contributes to
ideology if it contributes to the sustaining of power and domination (2010). Fairclough’s CDA
approach aims to uncover unequal relations of power with the purpose of changing them.
According to Fairclough, this is a type of research that aims to uncover how contemporary
capitalism affects human well-being and has a political purpose of emancipation from oppression
(2010).
Van Dijk’s approach to discourse analysis, particularly that of media representation which is a
major focus of this thesis research, concentrates on the systematic description of the “semantic”
and “syntactic” in linguistic analysis. His most prominent research discusses the issue of
reproduction of racism in news sources (van Dijk, 1998). Van Dijk’s framework centers around
the concept of “the ideological square” which employs and is functioned by primarily a
polarization strategy of between ‘us’ and them, “which involves positive in-group description
and negative out-group description (1998:33). So an ideological account would:
1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions
4. Mitigate their good properties/actions. (1998:33)” (Philo citing van Djik, 2007, p. 121)
This framework to analyzing discourse serves as a key conceptual tool in my research on
Egyptian media in assessing discursive patterns in how the irregular migrant issue is presented.
The major contributor of the origins of the idea of discourse as “practices that systematically
form the objects of which they speak,” is based upon or indebted to the work of Michel Foucault
(1969). Foucault largely influenced the formation of post-structuralist intellectual tradition and
his work on discourse has been particularly significant as it provided systemic analysis on a wide
variety of social realms such as crime, sexuality and mental health. In his notable paper on the
topic, The Order of the Discourse, Foucault asserts that “in every society the production of
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a… number of
procedures” (1981, p. 52). In a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, three variables are
most pertinent, namely discourse, power and the subject. The famous French post-modernist’s
concept primarily focuses on questions of hegemony and the power of discourses in creating and
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sustaining dominant representations of “reality.” Foucault establishes the idea of the realm of
“social practice” that Fairclough emphasizes in that discourse is beyond the text or linguistic
speech, but that it is the space where the actors, institutions, and powers interact to maintain,
transform, or develop dominant narratives regarding concerns of society pertinent to that
moment in time. In this capacity, discourse becomes a force in itself, “a mediator and tool of
power through the production of knowledge” (Diaz-Bone, 2007). Foucault further describes
discourse as an instrument of “truth-making” by explaining:
“Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth; that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (1980, p. 131).
The discourse as “truth” can be understood as a mechanism of control by institutions and
powerful social actors to reproduce the social in reflection of specific hegemonic metanarratives.
Migration Discourse Literature
One philosophical work of scholarship that contributes to the body of knowledge on migration
discourse literature is Thomas Nail’s The Figure of the Migrant (2015). This work approaches
the subject of migrants and migration with a new conceptual framework that challenges
traditional modes of understanding mobility. Rather than viewing migration as an exception to
the rule of citizenship, which constitutes a perspective of the state, Nail argues that the migrant is
the political figure of our time with more regional and international migrants recorded now than
ever before. According to Nail’s theory, society is operated by the dialectic between
“kinopolitics,” that is the power of the state to create and regulate mobility, and the power of the
migrant to resist and subvert state authority by the force of her movement. In this way, Nail
interprets migration from the perspective of movement and the migrant, subverting traditional
approaches grounded in stasis frameworks.

This approach is interesting and applicable to my research because it offers a way to uphold
mobility as a lens through which I can study the discourse of migration. Nail’s theory
corresponds with the agent-centered approaches that I employ such as the concept of autonomy
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of migration (AoM). I will be relying on the works of AoM scholars such as Nicholas De
Genova, Papadoulous, and Sandro Mezzandra to represent the migrant subjectivities as a
foundation for understanding border policies. According to Papadopoulos et al., “To speak of the
autonomy of migration is to understand migration as a social movement in the literal sense of the
words, not as a mere response to economic and social malaise” (2008, p. 202). However, “the
autonomy of migration approach does not, of course, consider migration in isolation from social,
cultural and economic structures. The opposite is true: migration is understood as a creative force
within these structures” (2008, p. 202). AoM is derived from Autonomous Marxist thought that
prescribes a subversive quality to migrants in general, and irregular migrants in particular “on
account of their potential to undermine the sovereign order according to which borders are
policed” (McNevin, 2013, p. 184). This thesis uses AoM as a way of refuting major discursive
depictions of the Egyptian irregular migrant as a rash, young, unaware fool from the countryside
to a destitute victim of his conditions that will be discussed in chapter two.

When considering discourses of criminalization and security, I draw upon securitization theory
by the Copenhagen School to demonstrate how mobility is continuously securitized through
mechanisms that are legitimized by language or “speech-act.” According to the major theorists of
this notion, securitization is “the discursive process through which an intersubjective
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal
with the treat” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). I apply this concept when dissecting the ways
migration issues are presented in both the Egyptian context and the wider European
securitization in which the Egyptian discourse adopts internally.

Concepts of how humanitarian discourse is coopted to work within the wider securitization
discourse will also be a tool in examining themes of irregular migration. This has been discussed
by a few different scholars but I specifically draw upon the works of Paul Amar (2013) which
discusses how security measures and the language of humanitarianism are increasingly coming
together in building new ways of human security governance. In these new modes of
governmentality Amar argues that the “hypervisibilisation” or the spotlighting of certain bodies
as sources insecurity or risk is a tool in establishing securitization (2013).
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When it comes to literature on discourse studies regarding migration, much of the scholarship is
dedicated to studying the image of the migrant in discursive mediums of the global North,
particularly on refugees and asylum seekers. Research in this area often concentrates on exposing
the role of the media in legitimizing and reinforcing the marginalization of immigrants and
refugees. Drawing upon newspapers, film, advertising, television news, fictional portrayals or
“new media,” scholarship has highlighted the consistently limited range of representations of
migrants’ identities and social positions (see Pickering 2001; Baker and McEnery 2005; Baker et
al. 2008; Lea and Lynn 2003). Much of this literature is dedicated to research on accounts of
asylum seekers and refugees in the print media from a linguistic perspective that aims to analyze
large numbers of articles to identify commonly used words and phrases. However, these kinds of
studies remain surprisingly limited despite increasing media coverage.
Framing of the migrant individual is often dehumanizing and creates “an emotional distance with
audiences that may facilitate their consent with regards to anti-immigrant policies.” (Guillem,
2015, p. 5). Many studies examine how hostile migrant discourses seek to serve broader rightwing political aims, elections and security measures. Studies like the one by Charteris-Black
analyzed political statements and speeches by right-wing politicians in the UK and found that
referring to immigrants and asylum seekers as “boat people” and “illegal immigrants” served as a
common discursive strategy to encourage specific marginalizing practices (Charteris-Black,
2006). The phrase “I’m not a racist, but…” also served as a discursive tool found in these
political statements employed to construct a view that opposing asylum seeking is not racist,
which was also disseminated by anti-immigration groups to legitimize this position (Parker,
2015). These studies analyze how discursive practices maintain the “us” versus “them”
dichotomy. Other studies, such as the pioneering interdisciplinary research on migration and
media conducted by the Glasgow Media Group, shows how immigration in this context is
routinely discussed within an overall framework of “bad news,” associated with terms that
invoke crisis.

Often scholarship dedicated to migrant discursive studies focuses on how host communities
construct the representation of the immigrant “other,” drawing links between migration discourse
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and racism, nationalism, multiculturalism or diversity, drawing upon van Dijk’s well-known
research of racism in news accounts (2003). How discourses perpetuate the portrayal of the
migrant as a dangerous threat to the western host country’s economy and values is also a
reoccurring theme in these types of publications. General arguments made by scholars in the
field of migrant discourse examines how discursive frameworks in the media of western
countries “capitalize on creating unnecessary state of alarm that can fuel not only anti-immigrant
public attitudes, but also discriminatory government actions, as well as racist and xenophobic
criminal acts” (Guillem, 2015, p. 6).

Some major themes of coming out of research conducted on media representation of the
discursive construction of the irregular migrant in UK and Australian news sources are outlined
in a study by Parker (2015) as follows. First, a recurring theme of the “unwanted invader”
referring to the refugee or asylum seeker “as actively unwanted; as someone to be fearful of, in
contrast to the passive majority of the country,” commonly evoking metaphors of criminals.
Additionally, metaphors of water like “flood” and “overflowed” are commonly used to construct
accounts of large numbers of people trying to enter the country. The theme of the “dishonest”
asylum seeker was also identified in western news reports in which the immigrant’s past history
and integrity is questioned such as lying about their age and sexuality to portray a false image
that requires asylum. A third theme commonly found in these articles refer to that of the “tragic
asylum seeker” as one that needs assistance. According to Parker this account appears
“sympathetic to the asylum seeker but also actively warning the reader of the potential arrival of
further asylum seekers” (2015, p. 9). Lastly, themes of “keeping them out” and “removing them”
were discussed and commonly used for political rhetoric in the asylum debate. Parker’s findings
support Pickering’s research which concluded that the migrant was constructed as a “deviant”
population through the use of accounts which again differentiated “them” from “us” (2001). This
divide evokes the argument made by van Dijk earlier about immigration discourses, redefining
the issue in terms of race and immigrants as outsiders that need to be actively kept out.

Studies on how the irregular migrant is conceptualized in local media of countries of origin have
been difficult to find. In the context of the Middle East, migration studies often focus on the
movement of the forcibly displaced concentrating of push-pull factors and economic and
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political strains on host countries often from a policy perspective. When it comes to Egypt,
although representation of the Egyptian migrant who crosses the Mediterranean through irregular
means has been plentiful in Egyptian media, as irregular migration has been a prominent reoccurring issue in the press, academic scholarship examining this corpus falls short. My research
aims to help fill this gap in the literature.

1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This research builds on existing migrant discourse literature and intends to contribute to this kind
of scholarship regarding the Egyptian context. Conceptually, this research brings together
different elements of discourse, image, and representation of the specific issue of unauthorized
movement across borders using Egyptians that migrate to Europe as a case study. By analyzing
the representational realm of this phenomenon, more fundamental questions of power and the
relationships between the state, the individual, and the society are brought into focus. In other
words, this research uses migration representation as a lens to understanding these wider
relationships. While the state may construct the migrant as a criminal, a victim, or an ignorant, it
does so for very particular reasons that serve its interests and wider securitization interests of the
global North. Media becomes an excellent tool to observe how this relationship is played out,
and critically assessing the various narratives that come to represent this issue- which at their
core deal with notions power, state-society relations, population control and border regimes, and
citizenship- start to become clearer. It is by dissecting this intersection between what the
discourse says and the power relations of national and international authoritative figures and
institutions that allow for its hegemonic nature that the researcher comes to understand the
constructions of the Egyptian irregular migrant and the purposes they serve.

As discussed previously, this thesis is concerned primarily with identifying representations of the
Egyptian irregular migrant within the Egyptian context and tracing the production of such
discourse by highlighting the power dynamics that allow for the dominance of the identified
narratives. In addition to identifying and describing the major representations that have been
constructed of Egyptian irregular migrants and their framings, this research complicates and
scrutinizes these narratives and the discursive patterns that are observed.
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In light of the fieldwork which demonstrates major themes dealing with blame, denial of local
job opportunities, accountability, awareness, nationalism, and criminality and securitization,
scholarship from various bodies of knowledge will be called upon to problematize and unpack
such themes. First, the subjectivity and agency of the migrant is addressed using anthropological
literature, specifically scholars of the autonomy of migration field. Second, in order to properly
answer to narratives that both deny foundational socio-economic issues as reason for irregular
migration and deny the state’s failure to provide a decent living for its residents, I engage
prominent economic scholarship on the Egyptian labor market to refute and contextualize such
discourse.

To elaborate, in the effort to understand the issue of irregular migration of Egyptian natives, I
connect the recent material conditions to wider dominant discourses that reflect and construct a
particular discourse of the individual’s desire to emigrate and question what this relationship
reflects. This relationship deals with the role of marginalization and the state’s negligence in
developing and providing for basic needs and employment opportunities outside the metropolis. I
engage with scholarship on relationship between emigration and economics by discussing
material conditions of unemployment and underemployment, poverty, and inequality, and poor
social services that often drive an individual’s desire for emigration.

Lastly, how the notion of mobility is rooted in a securitization discourse that is framed within
criminalization will be put into focus and analyzed using securitization theory. Since discourses
do not occur in a vacuum, I will incorporate wider securitization of migration discourses of the
global North, particularly Europe. The implications of the ways in which the Egyptian discourse
invokes and adopts the European perspective is critically unpacked.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In short, I hope to provide a multi-dimensional approach to understanding the following
questions:
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1. What are the discourses framing the image of the Egyptian irregular migrant, particularly
in the wake of the Rasheed capsizing, in Egypt?
2. What is the utility of these narrative constructions for the Egyptian state in the current
socio-economic and political moment?
3. How does discourse on irregular migration in Egypt connect to wider migrantsecuritization discourse, such as that emanating from “Fortress Europe”?

It is my hypotheses that the hegemonic discourse surrounding that of irregular migration of
Egyptians across is one that portrays the migrant-subject as one who brought misfortune upon
himself; by blaming the individual migrant for his decision to move, the discourse protects the
state from shouldering responsibility toward tragedies like Rasheed, and more fundamentally, for
not providing conditions to allow these citizens to live a decent life. I propose that this discourse
is the case because unauthorized movement of this sort is threatening for several reasons. First,
Egyptian citizens risking their lives by the thousands highlights failures of the state and
government neglect in areas of development, employment, social services, and general politics of
exclusion of those in marginalized parts of the country. It thus becomes in the interest of those in
power to propagate a discourse that shames and blames migrants, invoking a nationalist ethos, to
shift accountability away from major state actors and institutions. Secondly, this type of
migration subverts the regime of borders and territorial controls, threatening notions of nationstate sovereignty. Due to this relationship, an “illegal” migrant becomes a site of insecurity for
the state, and so discourse that presents the migrant and the process of mobility as dangerous
serves to aid in legitimizing enhanced policing and border control measures. Finally, the process
of the externalization of EU borders and the funding that accompanies it ensures Egyptian
adoption of European securitization discourses.

1.6 METHODOLOGY
In this section I will describe the material to be used as data for my research and also explain
how the research will be analyzed. I will analyze the representation of a migrant by compiling
and drawing upon a diverse corpus of both official and non-official sources that discuss the
Egyptians migrating through irregular means, the phenomenon itself, its actors and the role of the
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state. First, I plan to use critical discourse analysis method to analyze the Egyptian official
narrative on unauthorized migration using sources like statements and speeches made by public
officials. Additionally, I will analyze how the Egyptian clandestine has been portrayed and
discussed in media outlets, namely television talk shows and the press across the political
spectrum along with popular culture productions in order to identify how the image of the
Egyptian migrant and the wider migration crisis is depicted and addressed. I will question the
relationship between official and media narratives; to what extent does television programming
and the press channel or challenge state narratives? By analyzing this discourse, I hope to
investigate and elaborate the connection between language use and unequal relations of power
(Fairclough, 2003).

The bulk of my research will be assembling and then synthesizing a corpus of official statements,
news articles, and clips of television programming that deal with the issue of irregular migrants,
and in particular, the Rasheed incident. I will go through official statements (made available on
state websites and news sources) made by public officials. Relevant op-eds, editorials, and
columns from the Egyptian press that discuss Rasheed and the Egyptian migrant have also been
collected from various dailies and weekly publications. Segments of television programming
across the political spectrum to build a media corpus on how Egyptian migrant has been depicted
will also be used as research data. These are accessed by searching through recordings of
programming on satellite television channel websites and video sharing platforms like YouTube.

Discourse is informed also by cultural production, so to allow for a more holistic representation
of how the Egyptian migrant is imagined, the film Al Barr al Tani or The Other Side, a recent
film by director Ali Idris depicting the journey of three young men from rural villages attempting
to cross the Mediterranean to Italy will be critically analyzed. Alongside the film, music and a
commercial will serve as sources of cultural production analysis.

Press coverage of the topic of irregular migration in the Egyptian context, including legal and
policy developments, coverage on conferences, committees, or initiatives that deal with this issue
when analyzing the role of state. Information on recent developments in securitization measures
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or national policies regarding illegal migration in Egypt will be collected from online news
sources.

To summarize, this research will introduce how the subject of the Egyptian irregular migrant has
been discursively represented. The themes and narratives identified in the following major
sources will be used as the data for the following contextual critical discourse analysis to be
presented in this thesis. This thesis will use critical discourse analysis as a method of analysis of
the corpus collected. Descriptions of various text will be accompanied by a detailed analysis
throughout the chapters. This thesis is chiefly concerned with drawing deeper connections
between text and the wider purposes of the type of production and organization of knowledge it
serves.

1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Discourses of a tragedy: On Blame, Accountability, and Victimization
In this chapter I illustrate a few of the major narratives representing the Egyptian clandestine in
Egypt, particularly concerning discourse surrounding the Rasheed event as it generated much
public debate. This chapter is concerned with identifying and analyzing some of the major
themes found in the fieldwork, such as migrant-blaming and migrant-as-victim constructions.
The utility of these discourses in relation to state accountability with regards to irregular
migration is discussed critically. This chapter also responds to these narratives by using
autonomy of migration theory to address how the migrant’s agency, rationality and right to
mobility in these constructions are denied.

Chapter 3: The Nation-State and the Migrant
This chapter covers how nationalist discourse permeates throughout coverage and language used
to talk about those who seek to journey across the Mediterranean. Here, I will engage
conceptually the rhetorical theme of the homeland and the specific ways in which nationalist
discourse is invoked. The ways in which the prospective migrant in this narrative is constructed
as committing a kind of betrayal to his country is demonstrated. When examining this discourse,
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questions of what the threat of mobility and mobile subjects pose to the nation-state imaginary
and sovereignty arise and are analyzed. In the second section of this chapter, I consider the
rhetoric of state-industry development that often accompanies and is invoked within the
nationalist discourses to deny claims of deep irregular migration-producing marginalization.
Alongside the idea of the Egyptian homeland as a lens for mega-development projects by the
state are often invoked as a cure-all for rampant unemployment, poverty and inequality. To
create a better understanding of the relationship of the state to its society, I offer the unifying
nationalist discourse in comparison to the “reality” of socio-economic conditions in Egypt by
engaging scholarship on the labor market.

Chapter 4: Internal and External Securitization Discourse
In the final chapter of this thesis, I demonstrate how Egyptian narratives on migration are also
situated from a securitization discourse. After briefly describing the context of Egyptian
endogenous securitization conditions, I examine the speech-act of state and non-state actors
which discusses the rhetoric of criminality associated with mobility. Since this discourse does
not arise out of a vacuum, it is crucial to connect it to wider discourses of the migrationsecuritization nexus, particularly border regime security of the EU. I will briefly describe
predominant EU security discourse on the need to combat the crisis of the “invasions” of
migrants and refugees on the shores of Fortress Europe, and how border spectacles such as the
imagery of overloaded boats, shipwrecks, and drowning people fuels expanded border control
measures, particularly in the post-2011 timeframe. The adoption by Egypt of external
securitization discourse is critically analyzed by discussing some aspects of the political
economy of Egypt’s relationship with the EU in terms of bilateral trade and aid agreements that
have a role in shaping internal policy and discourse on migration.

Conclusion
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CHAPTER 2: MIGRANT CONSTRUCTIONS : ON BLAME, VICTIMIZATION, AND
AWARENESS

Introduction
In a report for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, journalist Tom Rollins who has spent
years covering issues of migration in the Mediterranean described Egypt’s Rashid incident by
saying, “rarely are migrant tragedies so visible, so documented, so human” (2016). The capsizing
of the overcrowded boat nicknamed the “Prophet’s Convoy (Mawkeb Al Rasoul)” and the
images of humans drowning at sea and families awaiting bodies on the shore have constructed a
spectacle rendering visibility to the particular issue of the migrant that often frames the way in
which migration is talked about as within a crisis and securitization discourse. The spectacle of
the shipwreck serves various discursive purposes. Indeed, the horror of such a spectacle, a
“theatre of sublime trauma” as Perera describes, plays a critical role in the reproduction of
securitization and humanitarian discourses of migration (2009, p. 79). The ways in which events
of “unwanted” migrants drowning at sea on the way to Europe have been produced discursively
and how these framings serve specific securitization, militarization and humanitarian action have
been conceptualized in various anthropological and migration studies literature (see Amar 2013,
De Genova 2017, Perera 2009). How the same spectacles are discursively represented and which
purposes they serve in local or sending states, for example the current case study of the perceived
“crisis” of Egyptian irregular migration in Egypt, is a concept less approached. This is not due to
a lack of discourse on the subject. Indeed, the Rashid tragedy or spectacle featured prominently
in the local press, primetime television broadcasting, and public official and celebrity statements
and discussion of the event trended as a top hit on Twitter. The “Egyptian” nature of the incident,
in that entire Egyptian families comprised many of the passengers, the magnitude and visibility
of the tragedy, and accounts of survivors that highlight failures in the state’s search and rescue
operations, are all elements that distinguish the Rashid incident thereby catapulting the event into
the spotlight of public debate, commanding increased media and legal attention than other
migrant issues have in the past (Kashef, 2016). The spectacle of such imagery associated with
Mediterranean migrant boats sinking necessities a response, and generates a dialogue, identifying
and critically engaging with which is the interest of this thesis.
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The following chapter identifies and problematizes how the subject of the migrant has been
represented in different types of mediums in the Egyptian state discourse, media and the cultural
imaginary. The purpose of this section is to introduce the fieldwork corpus that has been
collected in an attempt to offer a representation of the discourse surrounding the Egyptian
irregular migrant and the Rashid incident. This study does not aim to be a comprehensive
analysis of every article that discuss the irregular migrant, but rather an analysis of a number of
diverse sources in an effort to offer a general analysis of major themes and narratives that depict
this issue. Throughout this section I will convey major trends in the narratives of how the issue
of Egyptian irregular migration has been approached and discussed drawing on official speeches,
press articles, television talk-show programming, and various cultural productions. News articles
will mostly be focused on the sinking of the ship off Rashid as it demonstrated an influential
moment in producing policy and generating wider public dialogue.

This chapter identifies and defines the different, sometimes conflicting patterns of framing the
Egyptian cross-Mediterranean irregular migrant in Egypt. It will analyze hegemonic producers of
migrant discourses (official, media, and popular), examining the power relations between social
actors and institutions in society. By incorporating CDA and Foucauldian theoretical elements
that are relevant for this study in this chapter, I aim to scrutinize discourse as more than just
language for description, but rather a process that produces a certain knowledge that influences
societal perceptions and behaviors. Migration discourse in Egypt goes through processes of
selection, exclusion and domination by dominant institutions and major social actors, resulting in
supporting specific perceptions and creates the power to define behavior. Critically engaging
with the prevailing discourses (government, media, and popular culture productions) and
understanding the ways in which they connect with global discourses on mobility can help to
define the forms of power discourse wields. This allows us to use discourse as a lens to
understand the dynamics of Egyptian irregular migration to Europe generally.
Discourse of a Tragedy: On Blame, Accountability, and Sympathy
Five days after the sinking of the smuggling ship which killed 204 individuals off the coast of
Rashid, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the population in a speech at the inauguration
of Geit El-Eneb residential project in Alexandria. A moment of silence was held in memory of
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the victims, which included a four-year-old child, before the country’s leader began his speech.
In his impassioned one-hour long speech on irregular migration and the Rashid incident that
turned into a lecture on the virtues of patience and a resume of industrial project plans, El-Sisi
regarded the migrant subject in ways that reflect and create a dominant discourse that is then
reproduced in other mediums. Oscillating between sympathizing with the dead and admonishing
them and perspective migrants, El-Sisi’s speech provides a crucial lens into understanding the
subject-formation of the Egyptian irregular migrant. I will break down the major themes of the
Egyptian head of state’s official speech and connect it with wider literature in Egyptian media
and government discourse in order to gain a better perspective of the narratives produced. The
extent to which these various mediums produce, reproduce, or reject dominant narratives on the
migrant Egyptian and irregular movement will be highlighted. Furthermore, discourse on the
migrant will be analyzed and put into conversation with historical, political, and economic
developments when relevant.

Perhaps most striking in this highlighted speech is how quickly the language and the messages it
conveys shifts from a somber tone of remorse and mourning. The president’s opening lines in
which a sense of regret is expressed on behalf of the state gives way to an admonishing and
patriarchal tone, not unlike that of a father disappointed in his children. El-Sisi begins by saying,
“The truth is we certainly do not have any justification or excuse to have lost 160 victims,
Egyptians or otherwise…we must confront [this issue] with all of our strength, but I am not just
talking about the state, honestly, I am talking about the state and the society” (Al Nahar Al
Youm, 2016). Almost immediately, El-Sisi begins placing the onus on members of society to
tackle the issue of migrants drowning at sea. Emphasizing the “impossible task” of securing 500
kilometers of the country’s coastal borders, El-Sisi urges Egyptian society to “work on it” to
ensure that such a tragedy does not happen again, declaring that to have just one victim is too
difficult to bear.
Sentiments that admonish migrants for spending money on migration while reiterating the state’s
support for young people expressed by El-Sisi in the aftermath of Rasheed captures the type of
production of knowledge of the Egyptian migrant in the public sphere. Rebuking the migrants
who pay smugglers around LE35,000 to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life in
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Europe becomes a familiar discursive framing. It is an important trend in the discourse because
of the purposes it serves and in the construction of a particular “truth” it conveys in its repetition
in the public sphere. Such rhetoric spotlights the wrongdoing associated with migrant death
tragedies to the migrant himself. In effect, the migrant becomes a trifecta of representations: a
fool who misallocates funds, a traitor to his country that needs him, and a kind of victim awaiting
the salvation of a state that won’t be “leaving [him] alone” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

Parental Failures
Blaming society, families, parents, and the individual migrant becomes a common theme that is
repeated when addressing the issue of Egyptian migration by smuggling boats across discourses.
In an interview, when asked who is responsible for the Rasheed boat tragedy, Ambassador Nayla
Gabr, chairperson of the Egyptian National Coordinating Committee on Combating and
Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM), stated that while she contends that the government is
partly responsible, “the family is also responsible, civil society and the business community. We
are all responsible for what happens, and it must do its part for young people” (Mamdouh &
Hosni, 2016). As far as accountability for the desire for migration, rather than addressing
structural socio-economic inequality that prevails in across Egypt, Amb. Gabr advocated that it
“is the responsibility of the family and the school” to change young peoples’ minds on migrating.
Amb. Gabr goes to admonish local parents for what she perceives is their failure in instilling
loyalty and patriotism to their homeland to convince these individuals not to leave. Comparing
herself to the local resident of an impoverished village in the countryside or Upper Egypt, Amb.
Gabr argues, “We had international job opportunities too, but preferred to stay in my country to
serve it here. That’s because my family raised me to be patriotic and loyal to my country”
(Mamdouh & Hosni, 2016).

Placing the blame upon the victim and/or his parents is a narrative that also features widely
discursively in this context. In an episode dedicated to the Rasheed incident, host Mona Elshazly
of the popular prime-time television talk show Ma’kom Mona Elshazly brought survivors and
their parents on air (6102 ,)معكم منى الشاذلى. The coverage features interviews with victims of the
Rasheed boat capsizing, information on how the event evolved, deaths, and various testimonials
from survivors, families, fishermen at the scene, and an Egyptian official representative from
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Milan, Italy. Throughout the programming, Elshazly reiterates her shock of how parents could
allow their children to board such dangerous vessels to go live in a foreign country alone. Blatant
shaming of the fathers of some of the survivors for their gamble was narrated by the host.
Emotional scenes filmed in Rasheed in a video montage featuring the stories of a few of the
young victims were produced and shown in the broadcast programming. El Shazly, like Amb.
Gabr, the multi-millionaire television host compares herself to the families of those who send
minors and often expresses how she as a mother could never imagine placing one of her own
children on an overcrowded boat to potentially die at sea. This type of moralizing discourse was
invoked by Gabr several times. In a conference on illegal migration hosted by the Wafd Party
Gabr said, “Please tell me that you [parents] know that it is forbidden haram to invest in your
children to travel in travel abroad just so that they can bring you back a Euro; this is
unacceptable morally and religiously” (Issa, 2016).

In one particular segment, an illiterate 15-year old guest on her show expresses his continued
determination to return to the sea after three failed attempts, declaring how he seeks an education
abroad to be able to learn and work. “Here, there is no opportunity for proper schooling. My
classmates and I want to leave.” Elshazly then accuses the child of not attending school and then
remarks how she and the viewers have agreed not to judge anyone here on the show, however,
her pointed questions demonstrate the opposite. “Why do you think the travel to Italy is such an
easy thing?” Elshazly tells the young man’s father, “The person can risk his life, but to risk the
lives of his children, is not easy, it takes a very cold heart.” The father, who works to deliver gas
cylinders, defends his decisions saying, “I know very well the risks of the sea, I understand
perfectly what is at stake, but why aren’t you asking me the reasons why I am taking these
risks?” The father argues that boats before Rasheed never carried such dangerously high amounts
of people saying that the September 21st incident, was the first time people from their village of
El Gezira el Khadra or The Green Island, one that he estimates has at least one or two members
from each household as labor migrants in Europe, had ever failed to make it to Italian soil.
Defending his son’s position to travel, the father asserts to the host, “I’m sorry, but what do you
think? My son lives in a village without any services, he compares life in our village to life in
Europe, what would you do? I am to blame as a father, I am not denying that, but please look at
the reasons that put me in this position” (6102 ,)معكم منى الشاذلى.
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The way in which figures like Mona Elshazly address the migrants and the parents of the
younger migrants, is one that expresses shock, disappointment, and ultimately a pity based in
classism due to the rural-urban divide that has long permeated discourse relating to peasant
discourses in Egyptian society that will be explored further. Elshazly demonstrates bewilderment
at how parents could send their children on these boats. In her often expressed failure to
understand how parents and individual migrants alike could take to the sea amid such dangerous
conditions, she disregards their rationale and agency in what fuels them to take such decisions.

Discursive outrage at the individual migrant and his parents permeated the public debate on this
issue. On Twitter, the famous actor Nabil el-Helfawy stated, “We mourn for victims of illegal
migration and for their families’ pain, but our anger towards them and their families is greater”
(Aswat Masriya, 2016). A member of Parliament, Elhamy Agina stated that the hundreds of
people who drowned off the Egyptian coast “do not deserve sympathy,” adding that “the parents
of young people who migrate illegally, get caught trying to do so or die [in the process] should
be punished, because these young people are reckless and have not found anyone to tell them
right from wrong” (Osborne, 2016). In an episode of “Entebah” (Attention) on Mehwar Channel,
journalist Mona Iraqi states of the scenes in Rasheed, “You hear the wailing of mothers even
though often it is the very mother who is the reason for the child’s migration” (2016).

Talk show host Ahmed Moussa claimed that youth often migrated through illegal channels
without telling their parents and went even further to suggest that this often is the case with what
has been known as “forced disappearances” by the state, saying “I know this, kids go from
behind their parents back- and then they tell you ‘forced kidnappings or disappearances’”
(Moussa, 2016). This provocative claim was supported in at least one major paper. In an article
by Youm 7 entitled “After the Rasheed Boat Incident: 7 Facts on Illegal Immigration in Egypt,”
writer Mahmoud Abdel Rady also echoes Moussa saying that “there are dozens of young people
who have migrated illegally and their relatives have claimed their enforced disappearance”
(Rady, 2016). The forced disappearances that are discussed here refer to an alleged pattern of
men and women being arrested and detained by security forces abruptly without trial and their
whereabouts unknown. Reports by various human rights organization such as Amnesty
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International document the ways in which enforced disappearances have been used as an
instrument in crushing dissent under the auspices of counter-terrorism by the authorities
(Amnesty International, 2016). This practice has been vehemently denied by the state and when
the media links migrants to those who have been forcibly abducted, there are serious
implications. The extent to which media upholds and reproduces state discourse represents its
hegemonic nature. Most importantly, discourse in this case serves as a social practice and is
meaningful in that solidifies knowledge, shaping a specific social reality, one that denies forced
disappearances by attributing them to migrating youth in this case (Tenorio E. , 2011).

The Lazy Youth: Denying Unemployment
A key discursive pattern that characterizes the narrative of Rasheed throughout media coverage
and official narratives was the downplaying or outright dismissal of the legitimacy of claims
regarding employment reasons for migration. Denial of the high unemployment rate in rural
areas that often send migrants features in official state rhetoric by President El-Sisi when he
declared, “Truthfully, the homeland will never desert you, why should we leave our country?
There are no jobs? I am telling you, I swear, wallahi, there are jobs” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).
Almost always, this is followed with blaming the migrant spending money on smuggling and
admonishing them for not taking such funds and starting a business. Certainly, this language so
often used completely disregards the reality of the amount of capital it takes to start a business
and severely overestimates its profitableness and the ability to sustain a household off of it. In
this sense, the discourse serves as a type of strategy for answering to or denying economic crisis
at home. When the state declares that there is no unemployment problem, it is wielding its
power, which is often discursive as in this case, to construct a “truth” that serves its interests in
denying neglect on its part on one hand, and on the other hand serves to illegitimize claims of the
migrant. The migrant’s rationality in his decision-making is denied. Fairclough’s CDA allows us
to understand this kind of language in relation to broader social relations since it is concerned
with showing how “texts” of all kinds figure in social processes, social change, in dialectical
relations with other elements of the social (2003). Providing accounts of other institutions,
namely the media and press, that repeat state positions, one can trace capillary power of the state
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discourse in how it permeates through media and local actors demonstrating the power of this
discourse.
In his talk show “Cairo 360” on Al Qahera Wel Nas channel, host Ossama Kamal called those
“who say life in Egypt is death and so you escape to the sea…I’m sorry, but people who say this
are stupid” (Kamal, 2016). Kamal admitted that “people are living in hard times, there is no
doubt, but that is another issue,” going on to say, “for someone to go and jump in a boat illegally
to go to a different country to live a better life and say, ‘I’m free to do what I want’ well, you are
free to do what you want in life, but don’t wait for us to be sympathetic to you.” Media host
Ahmed Moussa denied altogether unemployment as a cause for migration on his show “3ala
Mas2oliyiti” on Sada Elbalad addressing the Rasheed event. Moussa explained how young men
go to Europe in search for employment opportunities, disagreeing that this is a sufficient reason
to migrate because “let’s admit there are job opportunities in the country,” commenting that El
Sisi has allocated LE200 billion for youth projects. “We need to understand the reasons- you
want to work there [Europe]? I am telling you now that there are no jobs in Europe” (Moussa,
2016). Minister of Manpower, Mohamed Saafan, stated in a talk show on al-Nahar al-Youm
channel that “Egypt is full of jobs in the private sector and it needs its people to build it rather
than migrate. I want to tell [the youth] that we all started small, I personally I used to get LE50 a
month on my first job” (Aswat Masriya, 2016). Cabinet spokesperson, Hussam al-Qaweesh, in
an interview on CBC channel also dismissed the idea that economic reasons are what cause
people to leave saying, “Illegal immigration requires a large sum of money, and I see that with
that sum any citizen can easily start a project in his village. This can offer him a good income
and save him from participating in these smuggling operations” (Aswat Masriya, 2016).
The repetition of such statements discursively offers a way of organizing knowledge on the
particular subject of the Egyptian irregular migrant. Across social media after the Rasheed event
common adjectives used to describe the migrants were “lazy” and “barbarians” who “don’t want
to work, and don’t have any values,” one user said, “You should die in the middle of the sea and
not get even get buried in Egypt. At least the congestion will ease a bit and the lazy ones that
hurt the economy will leave more space for others,” (Aswat Masriya, 2016). The collective
understanding of this discursive logic and its acceptance as social fact, regardless of the reality of
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the migrant experiences, illuminates the power of the order of the discourse in establishing
knowledge on a particular way of seeing the migrant experience.
Another side trope often invoked in public discourse is admonishing Egyptian migrants by
comparing them to Syrian refugees in Egypt. There is a common sentiment expressed at the
perceived “success” of Syrian workers in Egypt due to the proliferation of Syrian businesses in
the country post-2011. Although, the relative impoverishment and difficult conditions Syrians
face in the country is well-documented in various NGO reports, (see ReliefWeb’s Vulnerability
Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2016 report, for example) the discourse propagates this
myth and it has become adopted by and large throughout Egyptian society. “Syrians are hardworkers who have come to Egypt and embarrassed all those Egyptian youth hanging out all day
in coffee shops complaining about unemployment by their flourishing successful businesses.
There is a Syrian restaurant in every neighborhood now!” are common sentiments expressed in
public and media discourse. This language renders the Egyptian clandestine as lazy and seeking
an easy way out. Exemplifying this dimension to the migration debate, Amb. Gabr compares the
Egyptian migrant to that of a Syrian, arguing that Syrians and many other nationalities live and
work in Egypt, “Why don’t they go drown themselves in the, too? Leh myirmush nafshom fi al
bahr huma kaman?” Naturally, the same ideas are found in media coverage. Television host
Ahmed Ragab on his show “Mohimma Khassa” (A Special Mission) on Al Hayah channel
interviews a survivor of the Rasheed boat, one of the many in the crowd awaiting to receive
bodies on the shores of Beheira in the wake of the accident (Ragab, 2016). The survivor, a young
man, says that he wanted to go to Italy to seek an education and to work, “there are no jobs for us
here in Egypt, we would never imagine travelling if Egypt provided those things,” to which
Ragab condescendingly replies, “Do you know how many Syrians are here thriving and found
work in Egypt?” The young man countered, “Do you know how many Syrians were with us on
the boat?” The statement by the reporter neglects the fact that these other ethnicities do and have
for many years boarded boats to leave the country as Egypt has served as major migratory transit
hub for years.
The “victim”- blaming trend is rhetoric that is not unique to Rasheed or irregular migration
among Egyptian society. Indeed, it has often been invoked especially since 2011. Elaborating on
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this trend, researcher on migration at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights Mohamed
Kashef has explained that this trend or way of framing accountability has been invoked during
mass violence and crackdown on protestors in the revolution. In an interview with Aswat
Masriya publication, Kashef states, “Usually with various tragic incidents people pose the
question, what brought them here or why would they go there?” (2016). This has often become a
state narrative when clashes between state forces and the people occur. Such a narrative of
shifting blame onto the individual is reproduced in discourse of the Egyptian migrant taking to
the sea. The distribution of this kind of rhetoric has critical consequences that we can understand
by incorporating Foucault. As I have demonstrated, a key feature of the public discourse
constructs the migrant as a subject that should be blamed, one that is lazy, one that is lying about
employment opportunities, and takes financial advantage of those who support his trip. Through
repetition of these ideas and statements by major actors, a dominant discourse that warns against
migration and vilifies those that attempt to assert their right of mobility is produced and
sustained, and ultimately form individual and collective consciousness that influence individual
actions and perceptions (Tenorio E. , 2011).
According to Foucault, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which
they speak,” thus creating the migrant subject in these specific terms (2003, p. 54). All of these
depictions serve to protect the state from criticism of its failure, and more broadly serve to deny
deeper inquiry to more fundamental questions of marginalization by globalization under the
capitalist system by focusing on the individual’s (or his family’s) wrongdoing. By using a
Foucauldian logic, the quest for truth is always discursive and there is a truth effect that is
rendered when a certain logic becomes dominant, which is derived by social phenomenon. This
social phenomenon includes the production, regulation, and circulation of statements that creates
the dominant knowledge- this is a function of the state, to produce a category, regulate it, and
circulate statements that create a dominant body of knowledge, in this case the creation of the
migrant and the denial of the conditions he faces in order to serve particular political interests.
“Invest Migration Money Instead”: Entrepreneurship as an Alternative to Migration
Accompanying the discourse that denies the lack of employment opportunities is one that
encourages private sector intervention and “entrepreneurship” as an easy and beneficial

39

alternative to unauthorized migration. Indeed, advocating for individual entrepreneurship and
investment in the country instead of migrating is a key feature of the discourse surrounding
Rasheed and the Egyptian clandestine. This is in line with what Sobhy calls “global discourses of
active entrepreneurial citizenship to legitimize intensifying neoliberal reforms and to mask the
failures in the functioning of key institutions of the state” (2015, p. 2). This discourse links
banks, investors and the capitalist elite as the only path toward sustainable development in the
face of gaps and neglect by the public sector, disregarding the potential of local community
actors and locally-sourced solutions despite the ingenuity and efficiency often found in
grassroots initiatives and in the informal sector. In his speech, El-Sisi reiterates several times the
importance of involvement of actors such as banks and top businessmen in ending tragedies like
that of Rasheed repeating that “when the banks and businessmen help us out, put their hand with
us [the state], we succeed” and praising Bank al-Ahly as the biggest investor in the Geit El Enab
housing project. The responsibility of ending poverty is also placed on the ordinary Egyptian
citizen, calling on his donations in the “Fakka” or pocket change financial initiative that calls on
the population to donate their extra change to fight poverty, rather than any sort of measures that
actually work toward fair wealth distribution. While ordinary members of society are asked to
donate their livelihoods in the name of both the homeland and religious duty or zakat, policies of
deregulation and legislation allowing big businesses and investors to pay less in taxes continue to
be enacted (Sabea, 2014).

This clear discursive link is not just limited to official statements, but has been featured in
popular media as well. A Banque Misr commercial aired nationally compares the fate of two
cousins- one who takes out a bank loan and successfully builds a profitable business venture and
the other who migrates on a smuggling boat to Italy (Banque Misr, 2017). Both men are wearing
fellahin garb in the first shot indicating they are from a rural area. The advertisement then
features in a split screen footage the progression of each character. While Mohamedein joins a
ship packed with screaming refugees in the Mediterranean on one side of the screen, it is
juxtaposed with a smartly dressed Hassanein taking out a loan from the bank. The narrator goes
on to compare the fate of these two young men in their quest for financial success. Hassanein
begins a pasta-making business that expands into a series of factories in which he is depicted as
becoming a very successful, happy and secure businessman. Meanwhile, Mohamedein is shown
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homeless on the streets of Italy while the narrator sarcastically comments that he finds a home
and friends in his new friends- his sardonic description of Mohamedein’s plight continues
throughout the commercial. As Hassanein works in a professional setting, enjoying his success,
Mohamedein struggles in Italy working as a dishwater and escaping from violence and the Italian
police. The commercial ends by asking the viewer- “What will your fate be?”

The commercial is fascinating as a source of the role of financial institutions play in capitalizing
off capturing and propagating popular and official discourse that paints the migrant as one who
desires an easy way out, not knowing what awaits him on the other side of the Mediterranean,
and coopting that rhetoric to pursue capitalist purposes. The language used in the commercial
and its purposes demonstrate Fairclough’s argument of the changing nature of the discourse of
“new capitalism” (2003). The migrant in the Banque Misr commercial is one that is displaced by
a choice that could be easily avoided by a more lucrative option that exists within his country.
All he has to do to be a financially secure subject is to indebt himself to the banking industry and
all of his ills will be solved. The commercial exposes the common critique trope expressed by
social and state actors that emphasizes the capital spent on migration. It reinforces the knowledge
that spending money to migrate is an unintelligent choice that only results in misery and not a
way out of poverty.

The discourse of entrepreneurship as a means to end poverty, a feature of the discourse on
irregular migration in Egypt, does not come out of vacuum- indeed, it been pervasive force in
social imagination since the 1980s (Dey, 2016). The discursive link made between
entrepreneurship as a solution to late-capitalism’s socio-economic consequences such as abject
poverty has long been upheld by some of the world’s most powerful institutions from the World
Bank to the United Nations. An example of this is the UN report released in 2004 called
“Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor” where then SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan upholds entrepreneurship as the primary instrument for private sector
strengthening in the developing world and advocates that through this, market-driven solutions
will alleviate poverty (United Nations, 2004). While there is much scholarship dedicated to the
effects of free-market policies and the transformation of labor relations on increasing inequality
and poverty an analysis of the discourse of entrepreneurship has been discussed less. John Ogbor
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is one of the scholars that has argued of the “ideological control in conventional entrepreneurial
discourses and praxis” saying that “the conventional discourse on entrepreneurship reinforces
and reifies a mode of knowledge production that serves as an instrument for power” (2000, p.
608). In his postmodernist tradition of deconstruction of this discourse, Ogbor finds that the
phenomenon of entrepreneurship discourse is “discriminatory, gender-biased, ethnocentrically
determined and ideologically controlled, sustaining not only prevailing societal biases, but
serving as a tapestry for unexamined and contradictory assumptions and knowledge about the
reality of entrepreneurs” (2000, 605). When examining the narrative in the Egyptian discourse
that calls for saving the money spent on smuggling to Europe and spending it instead on opening
a business, we can apply Ogbor’s research and understand how it serves positions of power and
the neo-liberal status-quo.

To end financial hardship, the discourse often perpetuates the myth of entrepreneurship being an
affordable and lucrative option that is accessible to everyone. In reality, criteria for securing a
loan from financial institutions is often unmet by those seeking to migrate and in the case that it
is, repayment with interests usually drives people into a vicious cycle of debt. Money that is
collected to travel is often sourced from personal savings, families pooling together their
resources, selling belongings, or loaning from other community members. It then paid in
installments to brokers, not in a lump sum. To compare this capital with that of starting a
business as an alternative is a myth that neglects the realities of starting a business as a
marginalized person and overestimates its profits as a sustainable livelihood, if said business was
ever actually able to take place.

In the above section, I have described the migrant-blaming narratives that have dominated the
majority of the discourse following the Rasheed issue and the broader local migrant debate. In
the following section, I seek to describe and analyze other characteristics of the discourse,
namely the other side of the coin of victimization and awareness framing and its implications.
2.3 Humanitarian Discourses: Victimization, Awareness and Agency
On the flip side of the coin of condemnation, reproach and blaming of the migrant in Egyptian
discourse is the that of victimization. These framings imagine the migrant in contrast to one who
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should be blamed for his actions like the discourse described above, seeking to provide an
alternative perspective by creating the migrant subject as purely a victim of his conditions. A
humanitarian discourse is employed that focuses on pity and suffering becoming the
“oppositional” voice across the migration debate. These descriptions are depicted as more “just”
ways of understanding irregular migration. However, the victimization discourse does not
actually challenge hegemonic production of knowledge-it becomes a component of it- because it
denies the agency of the migrant. Indeed, humanitarian discourse supports not the fight for the
freedom of mobility, but rather complements, supports, and works within securitization
frameworks.

Victimization discourse is cultivated in several directions- one that drives awareness and
humanitarian discourse drawn upon classist discourse that serves to propagate harmful
stereotypes of rural migrants and fails to address material obstacles. Most importantly, when
there is a victim represented, this means that there must be a specific criminal constructed and
then punished. This criminal constructed in this case is becomes the local broker or smuggler, a
concept that will be elaborated on when discussing securitization discourse in the fourth chapter
of this thesis. Here, I invoke it just to point out one way in which we can understand how
humanitarian discourse complements and indeed works within a wider securitization discourse.

In all forms of victimization discourse, the agency and autonomy of the migrant is erased.
Ultimately, both migrant-blaming and migrant-as-victim discourses enable a production of
knowledge that serves hegemonic interests. When the migrant is cast as a rash young fool whose
drowning should not require sympathy, it absolves the state of its responsibility toward affording
citizens a sustainable life at home. When the victimization discourse is invoked, as this section
will explore, it consequently employs the perception of the migrant as one who does not actively,
rationally take meaningful decisions to not only control his life but to subvert nation-state
borders in search for a dignified life. In this section, various examples from the fieldwork
collected will be included to illustrate the “opposite” rhetoric that has been demonstrated
throughout Egyptian discourse. I will draw upon Nail’s theory of the figure of the migrant and
literature on the idea of autonomy of migration to support my argument.
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Across editorials, NGO rhetoric, official migration legislative committees, and cultural
production, the image of the migrant as a victim is common. Naturally, this relates to the fact that
there were indeed hundreds of casualties in cross-Mediterranean attempts from Egypt. However,
there are critical implications to the victimization discourse that call for a deeper analysis on
what purposes it serves.

Awareness Discourse
Complementing the rhetoric of migrant-blaming is that of awareness discourse called upon by
the state discourse and channeled by NGO discourse, and media and cultural production alike.
Like speech that blames the migrant for any misfortune that awaits him at sea, awareness
discourse serves specific interests and has tremendous implications on the subject-formation of
the migrant. As viewed by the language of state actors and various talk-show language
mentioned previously, there is a strong discursive link in employing awareness. That is to say,
awareness becomes a common argument on official and non-official levels to say that if only
these people attempting this journey only knew what was at stake, they would refrain from doing
so. The discourse of awareness is heralded by both state and NGO actors. It is manifested and
relates to various awareness initiatives that have been a component of the state’s response to
spectacles of shipwrecks at sea.

For example, at an event inaugurating the British-sponsored awareness project called Preventing
and Responding to Illegal Migration in Egypt (PRIME) executed by the IOM, Amb. Naela Gabr
said,
“Trying to convince them through telling them that immigration is wrong and it does not
follow religious teaching and we should enter the countries legally and telling them that
there is death at sea is not enough – what will convince him is that there are substitutes”
(Africa News, 2017).
Here, Gabr’s language reproduces major telling themes of this discourse. First, the wrong use of
of the term “immigration” is used, depicting a reproduction of the discourse and perspective of
countries of destination funding the initiative. This is the incorrect term because for Egypt and
Egyptians this kind of movement “emigration”, not “immigration.” Here the usage of this term
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becomes important because it demonstrates an adoption of migration language of the global
North.
Gabr’s statement also shows that in the subject formation of the migrant, there is always the
presumption of a level of political and social consciousness. There is a way of seeing the migrant
as a figure who is an idiot, one who is easily duped, one who lacks the capacity to understand
what awaits them in Europe. This constitutes a classist discourse which supposes a superiority
over those who decide to act on their will to seek a dignified life across the sea. Part of the
classism in the case of the Egyptian migrant can be associated with the rural-urban divide. This
discourse propagates the stereotype in Egypt that rural residents like those of Upper Egypt or
from the countryside villages of the Delta are inherently less intelligent and poor, in other words,
these individuals do not know any better than to throw themselves in the sea. Indeed, as Ray
Bush and Habib Ayeb support, “It is a truism that modern Arab states, following in the footsteps
of colonial powers, have concentrated on the socio-economic development of cities, particularly
the capital, and badly neglected the provinces. The rulers and the nationalist intelligentsia tend to
see peasants as backward and mired in ‘tradition’ that can only impede the progress toward
modernity that the elites desire” (Bush & Ayeb, 2014).

In the quote mentioned above, Gabr acknowledges and accepts discourse appealing to the
morality of prospective individuals who consider unauthorized migration. She alludes to
religious sanctioned discourse that is used to deter migration. Indeed, appeals to religious
morality are used as a key mechanism of NCCPIM awareness campaigns. Gabr does not argue
against these arguments that uphold that these individuals lack an understanding of what is right
and wrong, but instead qualifies that they are “not enough.” That there is an easy and accessible
alternative of entering the EU legally for all who want it is a rejection of the reality of heavy
border regulations of the global north and contributes idea of an irrational migrant subject. The
migrant subject becomes one that does not “get it,” one that requires convincing by an external
actor of the risks involved; he is a victim of his ignorance. Instead of highlighting and calling for
a reevaluation of the powerful mechanisms of the global north that prevent safe passage for
migration, the state is in line with EU policy.
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Other awareness initiatives include the “Baladna Awla be Weladna” (our country deserves our
children) project that is funded by the European Union and carried out by Save the Children in
collaboration with the Egyptian NGO Youth Association for Population and Development
(YAPD) (Samih, 2014). According to its director, Noheier Nashaat, the project targets young
people in the Gharbiya, Alexandria, Beheira and Assiut governorates. The first level of the
initiative’s mission is “to raise awareness among young people of the dangers of illegal
migration by giving them the support they need so that they feel part of the institutions they work
in and feel active in society” (Samih, 2014). The NGO also tries to help people find training and
work opportunities as a last step in its objectives. Another program by the IOM, the National
Council for Childhood and Motherhood, and the NCCPIM targets teenagers across six
governorates. This program works with local authority figures “to disseminate key messages to
children and youth on the dangers of irregular migration” (IOM, 2017)
In actuality, the individual’s decision to move is not based in ignorance. Despite the multiple
claims in interviews with perspective or return migrants where they emphasize their
understanding of the risks he places himself in when choosing to embark on the journey across
the Mediterranean, a lack of awareness is blamed in the humanitarian discourse. Moreover, this
emphasis on awareness ignores the fact that these individuals know intimately what this decision
entails much more than the media host or the state official, due to their encounters within their
social networks which often include young men that have gone and come back, as most of this
kind of migration is circular or temporary and relies deeply on the role of social networks.

Awareness relies on the simple binary that pits migrant victims against dangerous smugglers that
prey on their ignorance and dreams. This humanitarian discourse works within a broader
securitization framework. The overlap and interwovenness of humanitarian discourse and
securitization can be most clearly witnessed in the Egyptian context by examining the language
of a document describing the “National Strategy for Combating Illegal Migration 2016‐2026” by
the Egyptian National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration
(NCCPIM). Six pillars are highlighted as purposes for this group including the following:
“

1. Enabling Egypt to play a leading role regionally and internationally.
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2. Protecting the most vulnerable groups exploited by smuggling and human trafficking
networks.
3. Triggering criminal justice by sanctioning and deterring smuggling brokers and
networks.
4. Protecting the national security from the infiltration of terrorists through illegal
migration flows.
5. Egypt’s respect to its international obligations under the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and Palermo Protocols thereto.
6. Highlighting the political will for combating illegal migration and having a clear
national vision in this regards for enhancing our partnership with the international
community.” (NCCPIM, 2016)
Additionally, the committee clarifies the aims of its awareness project which are described as the
following:

•
•
•
•
•
•

“Messages of the Awareness Campaign
Risks of illegal Migration (drowning/exploitation and human trafficking).
Illegal migration’s alternatives (job opportunities/small and micro enterprises/available
opportunities of legal migration).
Importance of work value and proceeding towards achieving ambitions.
Need for skills development (retraining) which commensurate with the labor market
requirements.
Illegal migration violates the calls of all religions for respecting human life and dignity,
with all it involves of evils: forgery, cheating and fraud (fatwa Dar al‐Ifta).
Role of the national bodies (governmental and non‐governmental) in addressing the
illegal migration phenomenon.” (NCCPIM, 2016)

The discourse of victimization sets up a dichotomy of victims versus smuggler criminals that is
to say, as the victimhood of the migrant is established, its narrative works within a narrative of
criminality (Andrijasevic, 2007). When the NCCCPIM describes that one of the key pillars of
their mission is to “protect the most vulnerable groups exploited by smuggling and human
trafficking networks,” this invokes the victimization discourse that denies the subjectivity of the
migrant and his realization of mobility by conflating a willing migrant and a trafficked victim.
Doing so encourages and legitimizes the need for a securitization discourse against what foreign
minister Sameh Shoukry has described as “cross-border gangs” (Sayed, 2017). Text invoking
religion claiming that “illegal migration violates the calls of all religions for respecting human
life and dignity” is an attempt by the state to situate itself as a moral authority in order to shape
behavior in society, in the Foucauldian tradition.
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The language used in this document produces the knowledge that mobility is a threat that
requires strict government control. Discussing migration primarily through its relation to national
security reinforces the notion of criminality. In this way we can understand that while awareness
and victimization discourse initially may appear to be more sympathetic to migrants, in fact, it
serves the same purposes of increased state control of mechanisms of movement. The
representational dynamics of securitization of migration discourse will be examined further in
chapter four. Despite perhaps good intentions, these awareness campaigns that aim to advise
Egyptian youth of the dangers of irregular migration completely fail to address fundamental
issues of highly restrictive EU immigration and labor policies that predominantly create the
conditions for risky travel and potentials for exploitation.

The Migrant and Agency
Noting and analyzing the silences in the narratives on migration is a key component discourse
analysis as they are revealing in themselves. According to Fairclough, it is through their
recognitions that whatever can and cannot be said about an issue becomes perceptible
(Fairclough, 2003). In all of these representations of the migrant explored above, one aspect that
remains missing is the agency of the migrant. In his subject formation through discourse, the
Egyptian irregular migrant is many things: a fool, a poor helpless member of the countryside, a
lazy youth looking for an easy way out, a leech who spends all of his family’s money, or a victim
of his conditions. Indeed, the autonomy of the migrant is replaced by ways of seeing the migrant
that are in line with broader state discourse. Their rationality and will is neglected in favor of
more palatable representations that attribute a logic that is more convenient to dominant
discourses. Even in press language that may appear more “supportive” of the plight of the
migrant, the approach contributes to seeing the migrant as a powerless victim. Surely, migrants
who have taken to the sea have spoken in the language of desperation remarking that both the sea
and life in Egypt is death. However, many accounts throughout televised interviews demonstrate
other sentiments. For most, there is the imagination of a better life on the other side and in the
articulation of this alternate reality and in the courage to pursue it lies powerful resistance
politics.
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There are other ways of understanding the figure of the migrant that allows for a break from the
binaries of migrant-as-victim and migrant-as-blameworthy analyzed previously. What ways can
we view the migrant that emancipates him or her from these hegemonic narratives? Can we view
unauthorized migration as a form of resistance to systemic injustice that creates perpetual
marginalization and a subversion of denial of the freedom of movement for these members of
society? We can understand this outlook by turning to literature of autonomy of migration. This
scholarship is applicable to the understanding the experience of the Egyptian irregular migrant as
it offers a way to counter the constructions of popular discourse.
When we take into account the Egyptian irregular migrant’s calculated strategic choice on how
to reconfigure his life and advance his dreams despite his experiences of possible dispossession,
everyday deprivation, persecution, structural violence or various social, economic, or political
conditions it becomes clear that this subject is one that exercises what Mezzadra calls a “right to
escape” with intention and purpose (Mezzadra, 2004). The Egyptian migrant embarks on this
journey with knowledge of the risks involved that is drawn from deep social networks so the
view that he is an unaware subject is rejected. Refusing to stay put in the face of restrictive
border policies and inaccessible visa channels and instead taking to the sea could be viewed as an
act of resistance. From an AoM perspective, this choice travelling through illegalized means is
an act of refusal to submitting to administrative categories of mobility regulation. In this sense,
the migrant is seen as “part of an assault against arrangements of power that seek to contain and
control human mobility” (McNevin, Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political
Claims of Irregular Migrants , 2012).

Invoking this theoretical perspective here is not meant to romanticize irregular migration.
Instead, it is my intention to reject the dominant discourse and advocate for a way of
understanding the migrant subject from a perspective that prioritizes his agency. While migrants
are certainly pushed and pulled across borders by a variety of external factors, it is important to
see their movement as also “the result of subjective decision-making processes, embedded in
individual, family and community strategies for survival and prosperity” and that their mobility
is a “result of agency as much as force” (McNevin, 2013).
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CHAPTER 3: THE NATION-STATE AND THE MIGRANT: BETWEEN NATIONALIST
DISCOURSES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Introduction
In the previous chapter, various narratives of blaming, accountability, victimization and
humanitarian discourses were described and analyzed as key elements that shape the discussion
of Egyptian cross-Mediterranean irregular migration. This chapter will analyze how the
discourse on the Egyptian irregular migrant in part draws on nationalist notions of an imagined
homeland, focusing on the relationship between one and his country, and the purposes this
rhetoric serves.

When the discursive rhetoric that invokes the homeland and the nation is cultivated regarding
migration, it serves several purposes. First, the language used by state actors constructs an
imaginary of a nation that is protective over its citizens, a patriarchal and dependable force that
cannot accept the notion of its citizens drowning at sea to escape it. Odes to the homeland place a
heavy responsibility on the individual to endure any hard times for the sake of the country,
constructing a migrant subject as a traitor to his moral obligations as a patriot. Moreover, the
nationalist discourse also supports positions of state power in denying worsening socio-economic
conditions under the current regime. Grand plans for industrial mega-projects as a measure of
success are called upon to prove national achievements and serve legitimizing function in the
discourse. In doing so, major reasons for migration such as economic failures of the labor market
in absorbing workers, underemployment, poverty and inequality in addition to the lack of quality
state services across the country continue are neglected or silenced by these narratives. Utilizing
a unifying nationalist discourse helps to absorb class differences rendering legitimacy to the
notion that there are no reasons for Egyptians to take to the sea in search of better opportunities.

These ideas are manifested throughout official and popular discourses. In addition to official
statements and media discourse, this chapter analyzes the film Al Barr Al Thani as cultural
production that channels wider state discourse, serving as a warning Egyptians against irregular
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migration by sea to Europe. Moments like Rasheed and the discourse in response to it reveal the
threat that unregulated mobility poses.

The Nationalist Imaginary in the Post-2011 Moment

Nationalist discourse in Egypt has a long and well-researched history of scholarship that has
traced its making and evolution (see Fahmy, 2011; Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986, Pollard). Due
to the limits of thesis, I will not delve into the development of trends in the history, doctrines,
and various ideologies shaping Egyptian nationalist narratives, but I want to briefly acknowledge
the important role the idea of national belonging serves and major actors producing the Egyptian
homeland discourse, particularly in the various stages post-2011 period. It is important to
identify that the role of the Egyptian military in as a protector of the territorial modern nation and
as fighters for its independence has shaped much of this discourse. The way that nationalist
sentiment has been invoked in the Egyptian public sphere shifted after the January 25th
revolution. The articulation of nationalist discourse took on different forms at different stages of
the transition. In 2013, nationalist notions became a salient tool for reactionary forces that
supported calls for a military take-over. Widespread intensification of nationalist discourse
accompanied the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in the form of
patriotic songs, official speeches, and pro-regime media, and quickly thereafter that of private
media, that emphasized external and internal threats to the nation (Sobhy, 2015). In the wake of
the upheaval, notions of national security and the need to fend off the Egyptian state from
foreign and domestic conspirators aiming to undermine national interest were and continue to be
routinely invoked. This legitimates the need for a strong army in power to serve as bulwarks
against instability and chaos in the official discourse.

Identifying and contextualizing the type of nationalist discourse operating currently in society is
crucial in understanding its relationship to narratives on migration. As Egypt faces increasingly
difficult economic times marked by high unemployment, peak levels of inflation exponentially
driving up the prices of goods, and depleted foreign reserves, official statements of enduring for
the sake of the homeland permeate. Often, the socio-economic situation of Egyptians becomes
blamed on the revolutionary upheaval accompanied by pleas to stand by the country that is being
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conspired against. This is in line with both nationalist and securitization discourses. In his
speech, the president asserted that the country is experiencing a moment where there is
skepticism to any “government achievements” on the ground by conspirators that work to
disseminate rumors discrediting the successes and abilities of the military and the state. The
leader has chastised the media for failing to highlight the country’s achievements warning
against listening to those spreading “fake news” that doubts the accomplishments of the state in
attempts to “destabilize Egypt and discredit its authorities,” declaring that “there [is] a fierce
attack on the army, in addition to campaigns attempting to discredit the forces and personnel,
aiming to make citizens lose confidence in their army—so you should be on the alert” (Sakr,
2016). In this sense, the invoking of unpatriotic forces and the byproducts of the revolution that
are conspiring to hinder the nation work to exonerate the state from any failings.
The “nation under attack” argument invoked en masse by political officials and across media
platforms is not just described when talking about migration-development issues, it is part of a
larger discourse of crisis and conspiracy in Egypt that has constructed a particular reality of
national interests being undermined and threatened. An example of this is the common
comparison of Egypt to Syria, Libya, and Iraq. The Egyptian state has not descended into a
warzone like that of some of its neighbors and for that, the public must be grateful, or so the
political discourse goes. Speech-act by state actors and state-friendly media argue that the only
reason this is the case is because of the country’s powerful army, but create crisis through speech
by constructing an understanding that foreign elements are actively working to de-secure Egypt’s
stability every step of the way. The constant invocation that Egypt is indeed at war with
supposed conspiratorial powers and also with a militant insurgency in Sinai is called upon when
convenient to suppress and reorient public grievances against economic suffering and systemic
abuses of political, social, and human rights. In this way, real concerns of the citizen of systemic
inequality, unemployment and the massive increase in the prices of goods and services are
demoted in importance in this framework. “Egypt refuses to be a country of refugees. You must
know, there is pressure to make Egyptians become refugees,” El-Sisi states, a nod at the
discourse of the commonly invoked conspiracy of a global plan that seeks the downfall of Egypt
(Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).
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Regionally, crisis is characterized by war and turmoil in the surrounding states such as Syria,
Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. Crisis discourse, in addition to lending itself to wide-spread conspiracy
knowledge production, “provides the government with a good justification to lower expectations
in general and to project an image of stability against the backdrop of regional tumult” (Adly,
2014). Adly calls this type of discourse “conservative nationalism,” a different interpretation to a
long tradition of Egyptian nationalism stretching back to the early twentieth century. The author
characterizes post-2013 discourse as the following: “This discourse is nationalist in being
centered on saving and restoring the Egyptian state authority and sovereignty from chaos and
external conspiracies. Meanwhile, it is conservative in being supportive of the reestablishment of
the old paternalistic authoritarian state, the adoption of conservative fiscal and economic
policies, and the absence of any substantial anti-colonial or anti-imperialist elements often
associated with more traditional iterations of Egyptian nationalism” (2014).

We can understand nationalist discourse as a socially constitutive mechanism of legitimization
using discourse analysis theories of Fairclough (2003) and Van Djik (2001). Discursive
strategies by prominent actors that emphasize the national imaginary in warning against irregular
migration serve as important tool of reproductively legitimizing and justifying the state in the
face of increasingly hostile societal conditions effectively asserting, maintaining, regulating, and
normalizing this particular knowledge.
Nationalism and Migration: The Migrant as a Traitor
Nationalist notions that permeate the migrant discourse are useful for the ruling class and
political elite for several reasons. I will focus on what purposes nationalist thought serves with
respect to irregular migration narratives discussed in this thesis. First, it supports individualblaming narratives outlined in the previous chapter. When a tragedy like the Rasheed sinking
occurs, instead of attributing the desire to migrate partly due the retreating role of the state in
communities that lack services and fail to absorb its residents into the labor market for gainful
employment, a nationalist rhetoric becomes an important device in constructing the migrant
subject as one who is disloyal to his homeland and thus deserves to face his fatal consequences.
According to Ernest Gellner’s theory, a kind of political legitimacy is maintained when leaders
and political elites garner public support through the use of a unifying discourse of nationalism
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(Gellner, 1965) . When the President pleads to his audience, “Don’t leave your daughters and
migrate, you can do it, you can stay and help build Egypt” there is an implicit assumption that
the migrant has betrayed not only his family but his country in his refusal to “stay and build.” In
this sense, the irregular migrant challenges the nationalist imaginary by actively deciding to risk
his life than to continue to be a part of the nation. The state reproaches those who have the desire
to journey across the sea using a nationalist framing. An example of this is when the president
declared that Egypt will provide full care of these migrants saying that “Egypt desperately needs
you” and that “Egypt will not neglect you” (Sakr, 2016).

This kind of discursive construction of the one who leaves as a traitor is not a new concept.
Indeed, as the autonomy of migration scholar Mezzanda explains, notions of “escape” have
“always been suspicious… it seems to have close connection with betrayal, opportunism and
cowardice, all categories that are both antipatriotic and foreign traditional virtues of political
action” (2004, p.267). In arguing for the individual’s “right to escape,” Mezzanda goes on to
describe escape and movement as “one of the basic tools to refuse banality and repetitiveness of
everyday life and its suffocating restrictions… in that way escape has been almost a privileged
way to subjectivity, a road to freedom and independence” (2004, p. 267).

The fact that thousands of Egyptians prefer risking their lives at sea than stay in Egypt coupled
with its visible spectacle challenges the fragile image of the strength and success of the nation.
This was described clearly in the words of Ambassador Nabila Makram, Minister of State for
Migration and Egyptians Affairs Abroad, when she stressed at a conference on irregular
migration in the Beheira governorate that “illegal immigration reduces the image of the country
abroad” (Hefny, 2017). Makram’s appeal for young men to not tarnish the image of the
homeland constructs the idea that there exists a particular way that the country is signified and
holds the irregular migrant accountable in ruining it. Makram in her position as a public official
acts from a position power, making her rhetorical contributions significant in upholding certain
values in public discourse.

Ideas of honor and patriotism in relation to the migrant have been reproduced by prominent
social actors such as one of the most famous Egyptian actors, Mohamed Ramadan who presented
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at the same conference as Makram. Ramadan channeled the state’s narrative describing crossMediterranean migration as a “destructive phenomenon” calling on Egyptian society to “unite in
fighting” it (El Watan , 2017). Ramadan went on to incorporate elements of nationalist honor in
passing judgement on those who migrate saying, “Work is rizk (blessing or sustenance given by
God), and it is ashraf (more honorable) for the young man to wash dishes in Egypt than to travel
and escape abroad where he can die and drown and return to his family in a body bag” (El Watan
, 2017). In saying this, Ramadan appeals to the morality of people, referring to a system of
values that prioritizes one’s perceived “honor”. This moral evaluation could be understood as a
discursive legitimization strategy as theorized by van Dijk.

The Nation and the Egyptian Sea in Cultural Production
Visual imagery and popular storytelling provide another lens in understanding migrant
representations. There is limited scholarship researching the concept of emigration in Egyptian
cinematic production, although it is a theme that featured often in films. In a study on seven
Egyptian emigration films, Pages-El Karoui discusses the identity of the Egyptian living abroad
and finds that the discourse on the theme of “the migrant’s identity, on the personal, familial and
national levels, resonates with the social imaginary concerning migration” and is “dominated by
a nationalist paradigm” (2016, p. 369). Her research demonstrates how “movie directors have
produced a very pessimistic vision of emigration, in a manner that is equally critical of the
countries of arrival as of Egyptian society” (2016, p. 368).
Pages-El Karoui’s conclusions were in line with my analysis of the film Al Barr Al Tani or The
Other Land, released in 2016 shortly after the Rasheed incident. The film directed by Ali Idriss
tells the story of three Egyptian men from rural villages who decide to pay a broker and attempt
to embark on an irregular migration journey across the Mediterranean to reach Italy, in search of
a better future for themselves and families (Idriss, 2016). These three men, along with every
other passenger on this ship, drowns and dies in some form after the smuggling ship capsizes. In
many ways this film reinforces state narratives of migrant-blaming and champions concepts of
nationhood. This is no coincidence as it was partly supported by the Ministry of Migration and
Egyptian Expatriate affairs. A note thanking Amb. Nabila Makram, who helped the crew get
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permits to shoot in Spain, is featured in the first frame of the film. In the premier for the film,
Makram said that she hoped the movie would raise awareness of the risks of unauthorized sea
migration (Shimi, 2016).

The film deals with several themes, but the overarching message is clear- stay home in your
country, to leave is to die. Leaving the viewer with the notion that to migrate is to submit to a
humiliating certain death, that dishonors the migrant, his family, and the nation, Al Barr Al Tani
is a cautionary tale that echoes official discourse rather than exploring the complex dimensions
of this type of migration through art. The film enforces state narratives in warning against
undocumented mobility, focusing on the heart-aching melodrama of dying at sea, rather than
making sincere attempts to understand the choice in taking to sea from the migrant’s perspective.
By channeling wider public discourse, the film neglects the role of the agency of the migrant.
The overall take-away message of the film is one that chides young people for gambling away
their savings and breaking their families’ hearts instead of enduring and working hard in one’s
homeland. Indeed, this sentiment was clearly expressed by those involved with the film such as
actress Afaf Shoeib who said, “I sympathize with them [the irregular Egyptian migrants], but I’m
also upset with them…Egypt is full of opportunity. They just don’t like their salaries and don’t
want to work. You find young people sitting in cafes smoking shisha all day. How can they
afford that?” (Shimi, 2016). Shoeib went on to say on Lamees al-Hadidi’s show “Hona alAsema”, “I hope this film will be a lesson for all Egyptian youth,” echoing the words of Amb.
Makram that support the suggestion that this film served in part as a project of awareness in
warning against this kind of mobility (2016). Concepts of nationhood are reiterated in this
message advocating for remaining a loyal resident of the nation, despite the hardship this life
presents, rather than gambling on a life abroad.

Two main figures are depicted negatively that of the brokers and that of the Italian coast guard,
who rob each of the passengers in order to let them pass. In this scene, the Italian villains offer a
look into what kinds evil awaits them in the Italian mainland, which none of the characters reach.
This representation as the foreign as evil supports the general nationalist themes of the film.
Portrayals of villains are in line with the discourse of criminalization of smugglers and brokers.
The brokers and the captain of the ship are portrayed as vulgar, exploitative characters with a
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complete disregard for the lives of the migrants. The very reason for the ship’s capsizing is due
to the captain’s decision to buy a cheaper boat with holes to save money. This construction of the
crew and brokers is a manifestation of broader discourse of criminalization of the smuggler that
will be discussed more in-depth when analyzing securitization discourses in the next chapter.

Much like the film, several songs have been released following the Rasheed incident that also
serve mainly as warning. “The Tale of the Last Day” by Hisham Gamal, representing the tragedy
of the Rasheed event, and “Fares” by popular artists Zap Tharwat and Ahmed Shiba are two
songs that represent the Egyptian irregular migrant. The songs do not differ much from the
analysis of the film in that the same message of warning against participating in this mobility is
cultivated and expressed. The songs and their music video clips rely heavily on saccharine heartaching stories of friends and families mourning the loss of their loved ones who gambled away
their life for a chance to live in Europe. “Fares,” in particular, proved to be extremely popular,
garnering over 3.3 million views when released on the IOM’s Facebook page (IOM, 2018). The
song features the tale of a friend coping with the loss of his childhood friend, Fares, who
drowned at sea in a migration attempt. Fares is presented as a rash young man who refuses to
“estahmel,” to endure his fate in his poor village. While the struggles that Fares faces of not
being able to live a decent life and follow his dreams in Egypt are briefly represented, the music
video focuses on the friend who must deal with this loss. In this way the audience is urged to
empathize with the character that stayed put, ultimately downplaying the reasons that led Fares
to take such a risk and to condemn the choice itself as “intihar” or suicide.
The representation of Egyptians crossing the sea in “Fares” is in line with wider awareness
discourse that presents exclusively the dangers of such escape and discourages young people
against leaving their homeland this way. This is no coincidence as the widely-shared song was
produced by the IOM, the UN Migration Agency, USAID in Egypt, US Department of State:
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, and the NCCPIM as part of a national awareness
campaign to support the Egyptian government’s public advocacy efforts to prevent irregular
migration. Upon release of the song, IOM Egypt Chief of Mission Laurent De Boeck declared its
intentions clearly stating, “This is an important song aimed at raising awareness among the
young population of Egypt of the dangers of irregular migration and human trafficking. It is
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important to try to make Egyptians see Egypt as a solution instead of contemplating migration as
the only opportunity to resolve challenges” (IOM, 2018). By tracing the material production of
this song, we can identify how these national and international institutions actively work to
create the ways in which we come to understand the migrant and the phenomenon of crossMediterranean migration through such cultural production.

To conclude, this section demonstrates how nationalism is a political tool used by the ruling
powers to distort or conceal or absorb class differences and inequality. When prominent political
and social actors utilize nationalist discourse regarding migrants, they appeal to an imaginary of
common identity and positionalities. While emphasizing nationalism is a rhetorical device used
in immigration debates among far-right populist political groups to stir fear and serve as impetus
for heightened securitization among receiving countries, it is also used in countries of origin for
different means. In the wake of tragedy like Rasheed in which Egyptians risked their lives to
leave the country, this discourse is used to appeal to marginalized populations. Nationalist
discourse serves as a way of discursively absorbing class differences and massive inequality in a
society as a unifying mechanism. This connection is supported by literature that has found a
significant relationship between nationalism and inequality. Frederick Solt argued that in unequal
societies, major political actors “rely more heavily on nationalism to generate solidarity among a
materially-disparate population” (Solt, 2011). Relying on nationalist tropes is a response to rising
inequality to placate government action or inaction that sustains and extends poverty and
marginalization.

Discursively in various representations of the migrant, we can detect that the national imaginary
is threatened by emigration. Unregulated mobility here becomes threatening to the legitimacy of
the nation-state as it unveils its shortcomings, a notion that will be explained further when
assessing wider securitization discourse. This is coupled with the fact that loyalty and sacrifice
to the nation is a notion that frames public discourse in a period marked by increased paranoia of
conspiracy in the current moment in Egyptian politics.

State Development Discourses: Mega-Projects and Promises
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One of the discursive patterns observed throughout official discourse on Rasheed is the emphasis
on mega-development projects as a promised solution to issue of the irregular migration of
Egyptian youth. “Is there hope? There is hope,” with this phrase that remains a theme throughout
the address, the Egyptian head of state launches into a highlight of the state’s role in providing
disenfranchised communities with new job-producing factories. El-Sisi describes that this part of
the monologue is “directed to places like Kafr el-Sheikh, Birollos, and places that unfortunately
send Egyptian migrants to the sea” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). Work on mega-projects in the
form of low-income residential complexes and manufacturing and fishery plants were
emphasized throughout the speech and hailed as a natural “solution” to the “problem” of
Egyptians fleeing to work in Europe. Mega-project developments are touted as accomplishments
and an oft-used discursive tool to argue that irregular migration to Europe is unnecessary since
the government will never abandon its citizens in need.

Throughout his speech on Rasheed, the president emphatically counters the narrative of
migration due to unemployment, highlighting various industrial projects. “Egypt will not neglect
you, and there are many jobs here. I will be held accountable for the death of each person who
dies due to illegal migration” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). The role of the state in accountability
of the Rasheed tragedy is features prominently in this discourse. That is to say, the speaker
repeatedly highlights the plans for or the establishment of several job-producing opportunities for
the youth saying, “I want to say that there is still hope, especially in the area from where the boat
departed. A huge ‘fish cultivation’ project will be executed there. This project will be the largest
one in Egypt, but its establishment will take time” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

Job opportunities from aquaculture farms in Port Said, Borollos and Kafr el-Sheikh were part of
a February 2016 agreement between Egypt and Switzerland called the Sustainable
Transformation of Egypt’s Aquaculture Market System (STREAMS) project, which included an
investment of 2 million Swiss francs (Mada Masr, 2016). The president called on residents of the
Kafr El-Sheikh governorate to actively take part in national construction projects instead of
migrating. These projects include Bashayer al-Kheir (“Good Omens”) housing development
project, a complex designed to house 1,600 families from Alexandria’s Geit al-Enab informal
housing neighborhoods. In Dabaa, another housing project was said to be nearing completion. It
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should be noted that this is the same place where state has plans to construct a nuclear power
plant with Russian support of $25 billion in loans (Mada Masr, 2016).
To support the government’s efforts in national development, the responsibility is placed on the
average Egyptian, to donate for the sake of the homeland. Despite the flows of money from
international financiers, the president placed the onus on the population to help fund these
projects. National development funds such as the Tahya Masr (Long Live Egypt) fund call upon
members of society, most already suffering under the burden of austerity measures, to donate
small amounts of cash for development. The president described, “I don’t know how you do this.
But the spare change — that is the fifty piasters and the one pounds from your transactions —
can be placed in such funds…We are talking about the transactions of 20 or 30 million people. If
everybody donates, we will collect LE10 or 12 million.” Invoking religious themes of zakat
(almsgiving) and citing a passage from the Quran, El-Sisi stated, “Please, please. I want this
money. I don’t know how to take it, but we want to put it away” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

Throughout the address, the president pleads for patience from rural youth for these
manufacturing jobs. He theatrically berates some of the sitting audience members, officials who
oversee some projects, for their tardiness is finishing low-income housing establishments and
calls for patience among members in society to see these projects through. “There is hope, a lot
of hope, but we cannot finish all of these projects in a year. We need some time,” El-Sisi
declares. In a dramatic gesture, the speaker forcefully declares that “we must break with
tradition, bureaucratic obstacles, and rules in order to progress and finish our mission… we must
work hard until the projects are done… these are not simple initiatives, [housing unit complexes]
are great successes” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

For years, grand promises of economic development and infrastructure have been routinely
invoked by various Egyptian administrations to address poverty. President El-Sisi’s speech fits
into this long-standing narrative, adapted to fit the post-2013 political and social framework.

Meanwhile, rural communities in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt have suffered from endemic
underdevelopment and neglect. Mega-projects have long been touted as successful developments
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throughout Egyptian history. In Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster?, David Sims
thoroughly documents the long line of state development failures in desert reclamation projects
that have been employed as an easy solution to Egypt’s profound social, economic, ecological,
and infrastructure woes. Sims succinctly writes demonstrates,
“For over five decades, desert schemes have consumed massive public funds and private
investments and continue to do so. Yet the Egyptian desert is virtually littered with stillborn, anemic, and failed projects. In spite of a few successes, the amount of land
reclaimed for agriculture remains tiny and its production feeble, most cities and
settlements remain ghost towns or playgrounds for the rich, and most industrial areas
remain sand-blown empty lots. Not a single proclaimed desert development target has
been met, and most are several orders of magnitude out of sync. Moreover, these many
efforts have hardly attracted anyone to live in the desert, and thus the national project of
populating the desert and relieving the crowded [Nile] Valley remains a chimera.” (Sims,
2016)
More recently, projects such as the “new” Suez Canal, an expansion of the key waterway, along
with the $45-billion-dollar New Administrative Capital serve as the latest in mega-development
fantasies that enrich private investors while neglecting existing urban and rural areas and the
needs of their populations. As Egyptians continue to face a housing crisis, none of the new
satellite cities have fulfilled their population targets. State sponsored low-income housing
projects, like the Geit el Eneb residential housing unit- the unveiling of which provided the
setting of Sisi’s speech on Rasheed, have seldom succeeded. As Sims notes, the idea of leaving
home neighborhoods is unappealing to most Egyptians due to the heavy reliance on social
networks in densely populated, well-connected areas which constitute various forms of support
from families, employment, and informal supplementary income opportunities. Often these
housing developments are far from city centers and therefore expensive to live in and reach.
Planning for such development suffers from a consistent lack of efforts that take into
consideration the lifeworlds of the rural individual and his community. When the state professes
new housing developments as progress to alleviating poverty and access to basic needs, as it
often does, it neglects the core social assembly of communities that they are targeting. Many of
these developments fail to empower these rural individuals due to a state’s neglect of the rural
lifeworlds and their spatial-cultural place of being.
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Irrespective of the reality on the ground of how these development projects mostly fail to achieve
their stated goals, if the project ever materializes at all, the mega-projects discourse continues to
serve as powerful tool in political discourse to demonstrate progress in the social imaginary. This
is encouraged by a complete void on follow-up reporting on these projects.

As the state continues to spend on high-profile development projects offering little more than
symbolic emotive rhetoric as support to the Egyptian periphery, residents of rural areas that
many migrants travel from suffer from a systemic lack of educational, health, and other basic
needs services. Government neglect and policies of aggressive privatization in service sectors
since the 1970s have resulted in dire conditions for the country’s most vulnerable. For example,
if we look at healthcare as one quality of life indicator, it can help to further contextualize the
phenomenon of unauthorized migration in an effort to refute nationalist discourse of progressive
development.

According to figures by the World Health Organization, Egypt allocated just 1.7 percent of GDP
to the healthcare sector in the 2014-2015 budged, which is below the three percent minimum
stipulated in the 2014 constitution (Bajec, 2016). This figure is extremely low especially
compared to many other countries that spend an average of 15 percent of their national budget on
healthcare. Patient overload is a nation-wide condition as only 643 public hospitals were serving
a total population of around 80 million people in 2011 (Bajec, 2016). According to the Egyptian
Centre for Economic and Social Rights, Egypt had an average of 14.88 beds in hospitals for
every 10,000 people, and Cairo, which has the highest number, had 34 hospital beds for every
10,000 people in 2013. Surveys from the Health Ministry in 2014 found that around 40 per cent
of state-run hospitals were unable to provide decent medical services due to poorly maintained
equipment and facilities. Public health facilities severely lack well-trained nursing staff and
doctors, and medications are not always available. Despite decades of health-care subsidies,
inequality in access to quality healthcare abounds as state funds have often been allocated to
upper-class university hospitals. Egypt’s health care failures disproportionately affect the rural
poor. Low wages in the public health care sector creates low incentive for doctors to work in
subsidized hospitals, and hospitals in rural areas are worst off because medical professionals
prefer to work in urban areas. Despite the ambitious promise by the president in his post-Rasheed
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speech that “by June 2018, 80% of all these rural villages will have public health services,”
places like Beheira have yet to see major improvements in healthcare.

Contrasting Official Discourses: The Economic and Labor Market Origins of Irregular Migration

Highlighting the socio-economic dynamics that have marked this period of increased irregular
migration by Egyptians allows us to appropriately contextualize this moment. Identifying the
economic origins shed a different light on irregular migration through the Mediterranean than
that of official discourse. To critically refute the prevailing discourses, it is necessary to unpack
the conditions it is operating within to understand the connection between the need for elites to
draw upon various blame and nationalist rhetoric. As Fairclough and van Djik posit, discourse is
socially constitutive in several ways.

As social stratification between classes and the gap between the wealthy and the poor increases,
a unifying nationalist discourse becomes more important than ever for state institutions and
actors to mask such differences in the name of the nation in a time of emergency. Now that I
have discussed nationalist discourses and how it relates to migration, it is important to refute it
by demonstrating the socio-economic and political situations faced by Egyptians, particularly in
areas that send a high volume of migrants to Italy and Europe.

Poverty and Inequality
According to Egypt’s official statistical agency that conducts the census, CAPMAS, in 2015,
around 27.8 percent of the Egyptian population were living below the poverty line, which is
defined as the minimum income deemed adequate for an individual to meet his basic needs
(Ahram Online, 2016). The Egyptian poverty line stands at an income of LE 5,787.9 annually
and LE 482 monthly, which is actually 48 percent higher than in 2012/2013 (Egypt Independent,
2016). Data from the latest CAPMAS survey indicates that 2015 witnessed the highest poverty
levels since 2000, hiking from 26.3 percent in 2012/2013 and 25.2 percent in 2010/2011. The
heightened poverty levels of 2016 coincided with the sharp increase of Egyptians attempting to
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cross the sea. Rural areas of the country in particular, such as those areas that are considered
popular for sending irregular migrants, have the highest rate of poverty. Rural areas also
witnessed increased levels of inequality and poverty during the past two years compared to the
urban areas where inequality levels decreased and poverty levels stabilized.

Extreme disparity among regions and governorates is noted in Egypt, in terms of extreme
poverty rates. Economic inequality based on the rural/urban divide is major feature across the
Egyptian economy. In rural areas, often the regions where migrants most frequently come from,
the probability of being extremely poor in Egypt is almost 4 times higher than for those in urban
areas (Ghanem, 2014). While poverty in Egypt is wide-spread throughout the country, it is more
concentrate in Upper Egypt than Lower Egypt. Upper Egypt represents a particularly extensive
poverty problem. According to a report by the Economic Research Forum, this region has about
50 percent of the country’s population, but 83 percent of the extremely poor and 67 percent of
the poor (2014). Hafez Ghannem writes that “the problem in Upper Egypt is especially serious in
the rural areas. Urban Upper Egypt has 11.6 percent of the extremely poor and 11.3 percent of
the poor. On the other hand, rural Upper Egypt has 71.5 percent of the extremely poor and 55.8
percent of the poor. Lower Egypt has less poverty. About 30 percent of Egypt’s population lives
in Lower Egypt and the region is home to 13.7 percent of the country’s extreme poor and 27.6
percent of the poor. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of the poor and
extremely poor in Lower Egypt also live in rural areas” (2014). Rates of extreme poverty
according to the 2016 CAPMAS survey indicate that it they are up to their highest levels in the
governorates of Assiut (24.8%), Qena (19.5%) and Sohag (12%).

Small farmer households in rural areas in Upper Egypt, particularly the female members,
experience the greatest levels of deprivation. Unequal access to wealth and the prevalence of
poverty in Egypt are a result of development failures in the past 50 years within the context of
state control and then the restructuring of uncontrolled capitalism. These policies have created “a
bad mixture” which “has ended up with less accumulation of all forms of capital assets and an
uneven access to those assets, which resulted in deprivation of the absolute majority and hence
less opportunities, less freedom and low level of well-being. The market-led strategies and
policies, adopted gradually since 1974, and reached a peak in the early 1990s, have drastically
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affected both urban and rural poor” (Kishk). Redistribution of land and water in favor of big
landlords have had serious implications for sustainable livelihoods in rural communities and is
considered one of the mechanisms of impoverishment.

Overall, the economic situation in Egypt continues to strain the population financially, with the
poorest bearing the brunt of suffering, since a higher percentage of their income goes toward
meeting basic needs. Austerity measures, such as the application of the value-added tax, related
to Egypt’s latest IMF loan have directly contributed to an extremely high annual inflation rate in
consumer prices across Egypt's cities, rising to 19.4 percent in November of 2016, compared to
13.6 percent in October. Meanwhile, the reduction of government subsidies of fuel which affect
the prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, and gas cylinders used in many homes, further
worsens the economic situation of many Egyptians. More recently, the flotation of the pound
also has led to a dramatic hike in the price of goods and services in almost all sectors and
industries. Devaluation and subsidy cuts hit the poor the hardest, 82 percent of whom are not
included in the government’s social protection system, according to CAPMAS (2016).

Unemployment

Persistent high percentage of unemployment and a declining percentage of labor force
participation especially among youth is a serious condition of the Egyptian economy. The
Egyptian labor market suffers from an insertion problem in that it fails to absorb new entrants
into the labor market (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). Youth unemployment must be considered in light
of the country’s demographics which brings to attention its large youth bulge. Studies by the
Population Council attribute around 61% of the Egyptian population to be under the age of 30
and 40% to be between the ages of 10 and 29 (Awad & Abdel Aziz, 2017). After the 2011
revolutionary upheaval, the country faced continued increase of unemployment and
underemployment for young people (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). The labor market can be further
contextualized by looking at the relationship between workers and the state in the immediate
post-revolutionary period. By April 2013, approximately 4,500 factories had shut down thus
leaving thousands of workers unemployed, further compounding the labor crisis (Galal, 2013).
According to data from CAPMAS, the Egyptian population overall faces an unemployment rate
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of around 12.8 percent. Meanwhile, in 2016, youth (aged 15-29) face an unemployment rate of
around 27.3 percent where the male youth demographic made up 21 percent and the females in
the same age range made up 46.8 percent of those unemployed (Mounir, 2016). This data also
indicates that the youth unemployment rate had increased from a figure of 26.3 percent recorded
in 2014. Despite the fact that Egypt is witnessing a decreasing demographic pressures on the
labor market due to the aging of the youth bulge population, studies maintain that this has not
corresponded to positive developments in the labor market (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). While
demographic and education trends should contribute positively to employment rates, economic
trends in the wake of the revolution have demonstrated that employment rates have decreased,
labor force participation among women has decreased, unemployment has slightly increased, and
under-employment has increased substantially (Assaad & Krafft, 2015).

Underemployment has remained a critical condition of laborers which suggests that while the
workforce may have retained workers, hours have decreased in the weakened economic
environment post-revolution. Wages are an important indicator of the quality of employment
offered and understanding the wage differentials between Egypt and the potentials that can be
made in Europe is obviously a key link in understanding an impetus for cross-Mediterranean
migration flows, especially in light of migration to the Gulf being restricted due to policies that
now make it difficult to attain visas and employment there. According to Awad and Abdel Aziz,
around one quarter of young wage and salaried employees make a below-average monthly wage
and about half of youth who are employed report making within EGP500-999 per month pay
range (Awad & Abdel Aziz, 2017). Only about 2.6% of those working are in the highest wage
bracket of EGP3,000 and above. Clerks, agricultural workers, and those in elementary
occupations were likely to be in the lowest wage range making less than EGP300 or around
USD18 per month. Keeping in mind that most migrants come from rural areas where wages are
so low, the link between labor, wages and irregular migration becomes clearer.

The relationship between the state and society after the military regime gained power in 2013 has
been extremely contentious. An IOM survey in 2013 showed that employment, corruption,
security, wages and constitutional reforms were the most important issues for young Egyptians
after the revolution (IOM, 2013). However, around 70 percent of those surveyed had difficulty
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with work after the uprisings with 30 percent claiming to have lost their jobs and around a
quarter were sent on forced and unpaid leave. Hanan Sabea concisely describes this period and
its consequences by saying, “rising costs of raw materials, the increased cost of living, curfews,
deteriorating environmental conditions, alarming food insecurity patterns, increased precarity in
the provision of services—most apparent in road blocks, traffic jams, garbage collection, power
cuts, and fuel shortages—and a continually widening gap between elites and the laboring poor,
have all culminated not only in the growth of both protests and violent repression, but also in the
rising tide of irregular (or illegal) migration and in the loss of life at sea, cycles of attacks on
Egyptian workers in both North Africa and Europe, the closing of borders, and crackdown on
mobility” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180).

As far as Rasheed and the Beheira governorate specifically, secondary interviews help to
elaborate on the labor situation. One Borg Rasheed community leader told IRIN News that
economic opportunities do not allow for a livable life, thus making irregular migration
inevitable. He stated, “Wages are very low; a young man here can work for 2,000 [Egyptian]
pounds ($110-115) a month doing two jobs, but that’s not enough to feed a family. If you have
sisters you need to marry off, what are you going to do?” (Haddon, 2016). Addressing the new
low-income housing projects, factories and fishery industry projects touted by the president, the
community leader argued that “the wages from these projects are not enough to support a
family.” Another community member, who once a fisherman who sometimes helps brokers in
the process of transporting people to Italy by helping out with safe houses to house prospective
migrants told the reporter, “The prices of everything are increasing – water, electricity,
cigarettes. There are some jobs in the date palm industry, but they can barely get you 1,000
pounds ($56) a month,” adding that “nothing will stop people going. It’s not just about the
money, it’s about a dignified life. Even if you threaten them with death, people will keep going”
(Haddon, 2016).

Despite government promises to raise the national minimum wage, the cabinet had reneged on its
commitment several times and by January 2014, this had resulted in “a new and massive wave of
labor protests between January and March 2014” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180). These street
mobilizations were met with “a particularly aggressive deployment of violence and repression,
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culminating in the criminalization of protests and strikes in workplaces, the detention (and
disappearance) of key labor organizers, and the social demonization of protesting workers as
traitors to the nation at a time of national emergency” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180). Severe crackdowns
on any forms of dissent culminated in over 40,000 individuals have been arrested in Egypt since
July 2013, according to various reports (WikiThawra). While a national minimum wage
appeared to be more and more impossible due to the regime’s fiscal challenges, legal obstacles to
private investment-related rulings were cut. According to Sabea, a new investment law was
passed which had a number of legal loopholes sanctioning corrupt practices.

The importance of highlighting the Egyptian labor market and the challenges of the socioeconomic situation facing Egyptian society is to understand the connection between poverty and
migration. The purpose of including this survey of unemployment and underemployment rates,
high costs of living, and poverty is to provide evidence of the contradictions in discourse of
migration that often denies this and instead attributes migration to greed. The nationalist
discourse is also used as a way of disguising these serious concerns and state failures. There has
been a significant amount of scholarship in migration studies that link economic factors and
migration. In Egypt in particular, studies by Awad (2017), Zohry (2006) and Roman (2008) draw
links between these issues as causes, combined with the role of Egyptian migrant social networks
and the difficulty of finding work in the Gulf, for the rates of Egyptians attempting to migrate to
Europe via smuggling boats.

Conclusion

The intent of this chapter was to describe and analyze the theme of nationalism permeating
throughout the discourse on the Rasheed shipwreck and ways of narrating the construction of the
Egyptian clandestine in relation to the nation-state. Through the use of nationalist language, the
state produces itself in a specific way in the cultural imaginary. Official discourse connects the
state to ideas of the homeland, one that is committed to the protection of its citizens. Nationalist
sentiments serve as a tool to unite society, disguising deep inequalities with patriotic rhetoric and
imagery that denies social stratification, poverty, and unmet labor demands. I have traced how in
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the wake of national tragedies like Rasheed nationalist discourse and the particular reasons for it,
highlighting the ways in which the state discursively positions itself in relation to its society
through this kind of language. I have compared this discourse with socio-economic conditions
prevailing in the country in order to contextualize the moment this language is operating within,
to further elaborate and compare the rhetoric of the pronounced relations of the state to its
society with the actual conditions the population faces. In any case, it is crucial to demonstrate
the reality of these economic and development failures as a means of analysis of irregular
migration of Egyptians, and I have chosen to do so in this chapter in light of the theme of
nationalist discourse.
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CHAPTER 4: SECURITIZATION DISCOURSE: THE THREAT OF IRREGULAR
MIGRATION
Introduction
Any discussion of irregular migration discourse is incomplete without a serious consideration of
the concept of securitization and border regimes which constitute a migration-security nexus.
Contemporary globalization allows for the ease and speed for flows of money, information, and
goods, however at the same time it is also marked by the proliferation of walls, barriers, and
surveillance designed to challenge or filter out particular bodies deemed “undesirable”. Without
securitized border policing and rituals of immigration regulation, there would be no “illegal”
migration. Precisely the reason why people have to go through illegalized and dangerous means
of migration to Europe is due to immigration regulation policies that make legal entry extremely
inaccessible. Western states have become increasingly fixated on irregular migration by sea
which have come to be viewed as an especially dangerous threat. The regulation of migration
within securitization logic requires heavy investment in the discursive and representational
spheres, which is something that the offshore boat spectacle provides by fueling the construction
of crisis (Smith, 2015).

To respond to this manufactured sense of crisis in the post-2011 era and flooding of migrants,
Europe has deployed even harsher and more complex measures in migration policies. These
policies are shaped and supported by securitization discourse. Therefore, it becomes important to
trace and analyze wider external securitization concepts when analyzing the discursive
construction of Egyptian irregular migration within Egypt as these discourses do not occur in a
vacuum. This chapter engages securitization of migration discourse on two levels. First, it traces
endogenous securitization within Egypt, especially in the post-revolutionary context, and how
such strategies relate to discourse on the Egyptian clandestine and the increased criminalization
of “smugglers”.

Second, EU securitization of migration discourse, and the role that is played by the spectacle of
overloaded ships at sea in providing the necessary “crisis” for securitization measures,
particularly post-2011 period will be analyzed in connection to expanded border control policies.
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This chapter also seeks to highlight the ways in which these two discourses connect and assess
the ways in which EU securitization discourse has been adopted in Egypt. To critically analyze
the power dynamics of this link, I will discuss the political economy of Egypt’s relationship with
the EU that have a role in shaping internal policy and discourse on migration.

Securitization Theory

In order to understand securitization discourse and how it can be identified through the media
corpus collected and the ways in which it operates, we must turn to its major theoretical
foundations. According to Copenhagen School theorists, securitization is “the discursive process
through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to
treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent
and exceptional measures to deal with the treat” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). Issues that are
securitized go through politicization phase where they are presented as existential threats that
require emergency measures, justifying actions that would not be normally acceptable. The
Copenhagen School outlines three elements on which securitization is constructed: “the speech
act,” “the securitizing actor,” and “the audience.” The key concept of securitization is the
construction of the notion of a threat, that need not be necessarily objective or real. This
construction is created through “speech act,” which refers to the actual utterance that renders an
issue into one of security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 71). This transformation is often done by
referring to the urgency of action posed by an existential threat. According to Wæver, “the word
‘security’ is the act…the utterance is the primary reality” – in other words, there can be no
security without the act of saying security (2007, p. 73). This speech of threat is claimed by the
securitizing actor who must be in a position of authority and political legitimacy in order to
influence the audience, whose acceptance of the posed security threat is important in order to
produce actual political effects.

Securitization discourse in Egypt

Endogenous securitization discourse has a long history in Egypt and in the Arab world.
Historically, security strategies often rest on a top-down security approach focusing on alleged
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external military threats to the state (Korany, Noble, & Brynen, 1993). Also characteristic of
these regimes is the use of security reasoning against their own populations (Ayoob, 1995).
Securitization rhetoric took on a distinctive quality in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution.
Wæver and Greenwood conducted a study to examine the applicability of the Copenhagen
School’s theory of securitization in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak (2013). Under various
periods in the transition phase of the revolution, different leadership all utilized securitization
rhetoric for all sorts of political posturing. In a study on the applicability of securitization theory
in Egypt during and after 2011, Wæver and Greenwood trace a few of the various existential
threats offered by governing bodies in the aftermath of the uprising:
“First, ‘chaos’ was the new threat – lawlessness and economic losses stemming from
political instability – and accordingly there followed demands for law and order. In the
next round, the remnants of the regime, through the press, increasingly attempted to
suggest quite diffuse threats from ‘foreign powers’, by which people were expected to
hear the West, Israel and Iran. Finally, in a rather complex constellation, as it sensed that
it was quickly losing grip of a position from which to securitize any issue, the regime
employed Salafi sheikhs in its war against the revolution to question the patriotism of
those who instigated the revolution, arguing that it was an American–Zionist or Iranian
conspiracy (Hashim, 2011: 122). The threats drew on untraditional elements, but they are
of course hypertraditional: security equals a strong state, law and order, and unified
(military) defence against foreign enemies. Internationally, the regime used the narrative
of the Islamist threat to securitize the idea that free elections would bring Islamists into
power, leading to instability and chaos both for Egypt and for the wider region,
jeopardizing peace with Israel. Sacrificing democracy, it was hinted, was therefore a
necessary evil to protect stability and peace, which was more important to the world than
democracy (Yassin, 2012: 150).”
After President Mohammed Morsi was removed from power by a coalition led by army chief
General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and the constitution suspended, a type of securitization discourse
was espoused that deemed political Islamists a threat and justified violent measures to counter
them and their supporters. In his first inaugural address as president, after El-Sisi provides a clear
example of nationalist-security paradigm in the following quote that has set the tone of policing,
conspiracy, and threat used to justify any extraordinary measures, a rhetorical pattern that has
taken hold in society and continues to be reproduced:
“This nation has come under a real threat that would have harmed the unity of its people
and its territorial integrity but our popular revolution on June 30 has restored January 25
revolution and rectified its course in a bid to protect the homeland and maintain its unity
with Allah's grace” (Kerrigan, 2015).
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Securitization measures in the name of combatting terrorism and those who are against national
interest have intensified. As the Copenhagen School theorists argue, “security is a quality actors
inject into issues, which means to stage them on the political arena… and then have them
accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defense moves” (Buzan and Waever,
1998; p. 204).

Using this logic, broad support from the Egyptian public was required for the government to take
a number of “counterterrorism” measures in the wake of the July transition of power. In fact, the
regime often explicitly expressed desire of authorization from the Egyptian people to engage in
its extreme actions against its targets. This wave of securitization discourse was accompanied by
policies that severely repress dissent, such as the anti-protest law and its ban of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The state has arrested over 41,000 since the ouster of Morsi in 2013, according to
reports by the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (Egyptian Streets, 2014). Various
civil society organizations have been forced to shut down, the militarization of public space has
proliferated, and free speech has all but been completely eliminated under the state’s crackdown.
The Copenhagen School scholars argue that security discourses work within and create a specific
rhetorical model of survival, immediacy, and urgency in a context of exceptional politics. This
was certainly the case here as the model was put into full effect by the state and state-friendly
media.

This background of securitization in the current moment of Egyptian history is necessary to
contextualize discourse around migration. As this thesis is concerned with media representation
of the Egyptian clandestine, it is important to consider the political context that media discourses
are operating within. Following the transition of power, the Sisi regime quickly consolidated
control of the state media and appointed new chairpersons for all of Egypt’s state newspapers in
2014 (Mansour, 2015). According to a report by Mansour, “the regime has used its media control
to demonize civil society organizations, foreign journalists, and the political opposition, and the
generous subsidies given to state media indicate that the leadership places a high priority on its
ability to shape public discourse in this way” (2015, p. 3).

73

It’s important to have highlighted the context of endogenous securitization in order to understand
migration securitization in Egypt and its acceptance. When it comes to securitization of migrant
discourses in Egypt, some research has been conducted on the debilitating effects of the
transformation of representation of Syrian refugees as Muslim Brotherhood allied terrorists in
Egyptian media (Smith, 2015). I will provide another example of how speech-act on smuggling
brokers has often been constituted as a key criminal figure in public discourse on Egyptian
irregular movement. The kind of discourse of criminality regarding irregular migration, and in
particular the legal developments for the persecution of “smugglers,” should be situated as part
of the already overwhelmingly securitized post-2013 environment that corresponds with
increased policing and arrests across spaces, spheres and sectors of Egyptian society.

Criminalization of Migration in Egyptian Discourse

After a national tragedy on the scale of the Rasheed incident, there was a need to identify the
“culprits.” The broker or smuggler was the constructed villain in the discourse of the shipwreck’s
aftermath, becoming the figure that requires heavy criminalization. In the face of such
heartbreaking losses of drowning men, women, and children, there had to be someone or
something that should pay the price. Almost immediately, language that called for identification,
arrest and punishment of the smuggler became a defining theme in the popular discourse.
In an episode of the show “Entebah” (Attention) on Mehwar Channel, host Mona Iraqi embarked
on a trip to Rasheed with the explicitly stated purpose of exposing the brokers of the trip, saying,
“My whole objective is to find the semsar (broker)” After a diatribe railing against the ills of
unauthorized migration, Iraqi asks, “Who is responsible for all this death? The semsar, parents,
and the migrants” (2016). At Rasheed, Iraqi literally goes through the streets of Borg Rasheed,
searching for the “very rich” brokers who “prey on villages, where there are no services” in a
fashion that is not unlike a witch hunt throughout the town (2016).
In an article called “The Actual Criminals in the Rasheed Ship,” Emad Eldin Hussein warns that
if “450 people and the crew of the boat move freely without being monitored” throughout the
city, terrorists can also move in the same way. Hussein argues that if owners of these ships are
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known to authorities, “why are they left to kill people this way? Who protects these murderers
and criminals?” (Hussein, 2016). Associating the link between smugglers and terrorism serves as
a form of speech act that links free mobility as something inherently dangerous, requiring
increased securitization. The connection between mobility and terrorism was also represented by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry who stated on a panel at the World Youth Forum that
“it is necessary to combat the negative aspects related to illegal immigration that represent
growing dangers on the lives of youth due to its close links with the crimes of human trafficking
committed by cross-border gangs who use their revenues for financing terrorism," (Sayed,
2017).
In an op-ed in El Watan newspaper entitled “Why Do Our Sons Die At Sea?” journalist Mostafa
Bakry calls on “those who caused death of thousands… worthy of execution” (Bakry, 2016)
Bakry pleads for increased punishment for “brokers of death,” rejecting “the great calamity” of
the law that currently prescribes the punishment for this activity as only three years in jail.
Invoking rhetoric of panic, Bakry argues “the crisis in the homeland is worsening, corruption is
increasing, and complicity by officials in the executive bodies continues, there is no real
punishment for the guilty in this country” (Bakry, 2016).

Advocating for stricter penalties for alleged brokers becomes a common appeal throughout
media representations. Hassan Zayed goes a step further calling on not just stricter charges
against the broker, but also the migrant himself. In a piece for Rosa El Youssef, he argues that
the most important role that the state can play in this issue is in enacting “laws that deter
relinquishing brokers and deter migrants… the imposition of severe penalties on migrants and
immigration brokers will limit illegal migration” (Zayed, 2016).

Here, I would like to put the above examples of criminalization discourse into conversation with
border policing in Egypt. Thousands of people in Egypt have been arrested on charges of illegal
migration and trafficking. Numbers vary, but the Egyptian military has said that in 2016 over 12
thousand prospective irregular migrants have been detained from various nationalities (CGTN
Africa, 2017). In an interview with Al Ahram, Interior Minister Magdy Abdel-Ghafer declared
that since 2017, “103 cases of undocumented immigration were foiled in Egypt as well 361 cases
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of illegal crossing of Egyptian borders, and 4419 non-legal migrants have been arrested from
different nationalities” (Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, 2018). Controls on mobility is increasingly
embedded within security and military apparatus that is justified through legal measures such as
the new smuggling law enacted a few weeks after the Rasheed incident. The 2016 law
criminalizes those involved with the process of smuggling with penalties ranging from a fine of
EGP 200 all the way up to life imprisonment. Legally criminalizing the “smuggler” can be
understood as part of a wider process within Egyptian endogenous securitization of expanded
securitization measures, militarization of public space, censorship, and corresponding policing
and arrests in the post-2013 period. While according to state officials, this law aims to punish
only the smugglers, I will critically analyze the relationship between criminalization discourse
and law demonstrating the dangerous purposes these categorizations serve.
Language that is used to demonize and punish the ambiguous identity of the “broker” is rooted in
a securitization discourse. This discourse focuses on this figure as the main reason why people
have drowned at sea, thus society would be safer with this menace locked up behind bars, or
even executed. Spotlighting the discussion on the criminality of the broker corresponds with the
enactment of the country’s first law against smuggling. This narrative serves very specific
purposes. Reducing the complex issues of unauthorized migration to convenient categories of
specific subjects i.e. victim/criminal, legal/illegal, etc. works a tool of state control of mobility.
Scott Watson argues that the creation of these categories that “remove ambiguity regarding the
identity and intention of all actors involved” in this kind of transportation culminates in a
“discursive exoneration of the state” for migrant deaths (Watson, 2015). Moreover, the focus on
migrant deaths through the lens of the criminalization narrative places the responsibility of the
human and economic costs of smuggling entirely on these smuggling criminals. This
criminalization discourse neglects that it is the increasingly restrictive border control policies that
encourage people to pay for the service of smugglers and toward risky travel.

This discourse is problematic on several levels. First, the ambiguity and slipperiness of defining
who is a smuggler creates a situation where arrest can be arbitrary and imprecise. The
criminalization of smuggling discourse relies upon and reinforces “oversimplified and pure
categories that deny the complexity of undocumented migration” and contribute to “problematic
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depictions of organized crime and humanitarian actors, and deny the culpability of the state in
the prevalence and danger of smuggling,” according to Watson’s study of criminalization of
smuggling (2015). Framing smuggling as an organized criminal network helps to exonerate the
state and restrictive migration control policies of accountability toward a path of precarity of sea
voyages and migrant deaths. The focus on smugglers as criminals shifts the discourse away from
the consequences of human movement controls and their role in producing “populations
susceptible to precarious and exploitative employment and to coercive measures such as
interception, detention, deportation, and criminal prosecution” (Watson, 2015). In this way, the
need to fight against broader systems of injustice and discrimination against “undesirable”
migrants are neglected, denying “the possibility of establishing a common ground in struggling
for freedom of movement and equal access to mobility” (Tazzioli, 2018).

The discourse of criminalization creates false categorizations that define the smuggler. However,
those involved with the procedure of carrying out a smuggling mission are many with varied
roles. It is in the interest of the state to narrow and reduce the ambiguity of smuggling by
organizing people into strict categories, this allows for increased state control over human
mobility. As Watson argues, criminalization of smuggling “is one of a number of mechanisms
employed by states that relies on the creation of abstracted and simplified categories to make
sense of complex social phenomena and to achieve specific objectives, one of which is
controlling human movement” (Watson, 2015). The smuggler becomes an easy target; as a
criminal subject, any blame or any punitive measures become valid and encouraged. However,
this raises concerns on how the smuggler is defined. It has become popular to describe smugglers
as operating in a highly organized criminal network. Even Egypt’s Interior Ministry has blamed
migrant deaths on the work of the smuggler “mafia” (Loveluck, 2014). Is the smuggler the local
townswoman who takes up the money, or is it the crew of the ship, or is it owner of the ship or
he who sells it, or is the smuggler the one in charge of renting the apartment that the migrants are
held during the stages between moving from land to sea, or the driver from one place to the
other? We can see that the dynamics of smuggling is complex thus simplistic categories that the
state declares are not-applicable.
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Contrary to the idea established discursively that these brokers work as organized mafia-like
crime networks, studies suggest otherwise. In a recent empirical study, Cambridge professor
Paulo Campana analyzed the organization of a smuggling ring operating between the Horn of
Africa and Northern Europe via Libya (2018). In this “first formal network modelling” analysis,
Campana shows that smuggling is not internalized within a single organization but rather its
“activities are segmented and carried out by localized and rudimentary hierarchies with a small
number of high-centrality actors operating at various stages along the smuggling route”
indicating that higher-level smugglers are largely independent and autonomous (2018, p.1).
According to Campana, the operations of transporting people through unauthorized means is “a
far cry from how Mafia-like organisations operate, and a major departure from media reports
claiming that shadowy kingpins monopolise certain routes” (2018, p. 13).

While it is true that smuggling has become a lucrative industry in its own right, the media and
political focus on mass migrant deaths at sea fails to accurate portray the dynamics of “human
smuggling.” Indeed, as Zhang argues, the majority of smuggling operations do not end in death
(2007). It is not my intent to romanticize the work of brokers and smugglers, but it is important
to understand the role that smugglers offer, a service of transport to people, in relation to their
criminalized perceptions. Migrants who employ the use of a smuggler rarely view their smuggler
as a source of danger or a criminal, instead seeing them as “the people who most helped them”
(Watson, 2015). I provide this representation not to exonerate smugglers, that is not what this
research is concerned with, but rather to complicate the strict binaries of victim/criminal and to
demonstrate the complexities and nuances of irregular migration that fail to be captured by media
and political discourse. The discursive reliance on shallow categorizations that criminalize the
smuggler, whoever that may be in a long complex network of individuals that facilitate
unauthorized movement, justifies mass arrests, detention and punishment in the name of security.

EU Securitization Discourse and the Spectacle at Sea

Mobility and the freedom of movement, particularly among members of the Global South, has
long been perceived as a dangerous threat, one that global north nation-states should spare no
expense at resisting. Although the movement of people from one place to another is a prominent
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feature that characterizes this era, mobility becoming the rule rather than the exception as Nail
argues, it constitutes “one of the most politicized expressions of globalization, and hence
construed as a security challenge in the political discourse” (2015). The process of the
securitization of migration to limit mobility for the sake of security is the paradigm driving the
design of migration and often, developmental aid policies (Huysmans, 2006). While this process
that increasingly embeds migration with security policies has been speeding up since 9/11, I am
interested in the shifts it took post-Arab Spring and how the discourse, both language and visual
imagery, related to these policies.

During and after the revolutions imagery of people crossing the Mediterranean became prevalent
across global media platforms. The spectacle of overloaded boats sinking and bodies drowning at
sea serves as a crisis of which the production of humanitarian and securitization discourses rely
on. The representation of this spectacle provides the necessary role of crisis that helps to fuel
increased human-security governance mechanisms. Explaining what Joseph Pugliese calls
“statist regimes of visuality,” Angela Smith remarks that “in order to justify these draconian
border policing measures, the state maintains an ongoing project of legitimation that relies upon
the visible production and reproduction of particular- and spectacular- images of crisis, terror and
horror in relation to the threat posed by irregular migrants” (2015, p. 7). De Genova argues that
“what presents itself as a ‘crisis’ of territorially defined state powers over trans-national, crossborder human mobility- in short, what is fundamentally a moment of governmental impasse on
the European scale- has been mobilized and strategically deployed as ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’ for
the reconfiguration of tactics and techniques of border policing and immigration and asylum law
enforcement” (2017, p. 5).

Sometimes discussion of this representation is clear in its securitization rhetoric like when Italian
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi compared cross-Mediterranean clandestine migration “a plague in
our continent” (BBC News, 2015). Other times, this spectacle is expressed through a
humanitarian discourse that calls for “rescue.” In both of these seemingly opposing discourses
lies similar functions, as argued by scholars such as Paul Amar. Amar argues that increasingly,
the language of humanitarianism and securitization measures are working in ways that are
complementary to each other to establish new human security forms of governing which he
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describes “aim to protect, rescue and secure certain idealised forms of humanity identified with a
particular family of sexuality, morality and class subjects grounded in certain militarised
territories and strategic infrastructures” (Amar, 2013).

One method that Amar argues that is used to legitimize this human-security mode of governance
is through “hypervisibilisation,” which refers to “spotlighting of certain identities and bodies as
sources of radical insecurity and moral panic in ways that actually render invisible the real nature
of power and social control” (Amar, 2013). Hypervisibilisation- like of migrants at the borders of
Europe- works alongside securitization, which Amar describes as the “reconfiguration of
political debates and claims around social justice, political participation, or resource distribution
into technical assessments of danger, operations of enforcement and targeting of risk
populations” in human-security governance (Smith, 2015, p. 46).

Calls for expanded rescue missions and humanitarian responses, which are considered
“progressive” or “liberal” positions, to visiblized spectacles at sea of migrant boats, are often
accompanied by practices of apprehension, indefinite detention, and deportation. As European
authorities were quick to announce the April 19, 2015 shipwreck that killed over 800 migrants a
“tragedy of epic proportions,” the discourse of the incident “was compulsively preoccupied with
‘illegal’ migration and the ‘criminal’ predations of ‘smugglers’ and ‘traffickers’ as pretexts for
renewed and expanded tactics of militarized interdiction, including proposals to bomb the coasts
of Libya from which many maritime border crossers depart, or event to deploy ground troops”
(De Genova, 2017, p. 10). As is often the case, humanitarian discourse of tragedy invoked by
officials supplied the pretext for the reinforcement and expansion of the conditions that escalate
migrant deaths, meaning the strengthening of border policing that force people to take ever more
dangerous pathways and modes of travel (De Genova, 2017). These are just some examples of
how the language of humanitarianism is increasingly working hand in hand with security
practices, such that those across the political spectrum all securitization discourse.

These human-security modes of governance have transformed in the wake of the Arab Spring
and thus, it is important to trace the developments of increased border regime policies in
response. In relying on the spectacle of crisis imagery which conveys a kind of horror which
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contextualize the irregular migrant as a source of threat and insecurity, increased securitization
and border patrol measures are justified. Discourse of “floods” of migrants “invading” the EU
produced knowledge helped to encourage, justify, and normalize legal measures that made it
more difficult for migrants to enter Europe.

The migration-security nexus that already characterized EU policymaking prior to the Arab
uprisings became even more embedded following the Syrian forced displacement and by 2015
had “undergone an acute securitization turn” (Fakhoury, 2016, p. 67). Although the actual size of
the post-2011 migratory flows into Europe were not huge, immediate changes in policies were
enacted to stem these flows. As early as May of 2011, the EU reacted to the wave of Arab
uprisings by extending the Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security that describes,
“Relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries on migration-related issues are strategic,
aimed at facilitating mobility but discouraging irregular migration” (Bel-Air, 2016, p. 21).The
EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) renewed in November of 2011
became the “overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy” (Bel-Air,
2016). While the GAMM regarded migration policy around three major elements of security,
economization of migrants, and humanitarian concerns, it was the securitization element that was
most prominently emphasized.

Politics of migration since 2011 have been articulated in language of emergency that require
exceptional policy measures. Tightened border controls, expanded patrolling and surveillance
measures were enacted. The movement of migrants from Tunisia and Libya during this period
led to changes of border policy within the Schengen. Border checks were reinstated and
countries such as Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark and Austria suspended Schengen
temporarily in reaction to refugee flows. Other states like Hungary, Slovenia and Austria tried to
block out migrants by seeking to build fences (Fakhoury, 2016).

Meanwhile, the intensification of the externalization of EU migration policy, meaning efforts to
outsource policies of migration control to sending countries, through the EU Action adopted in
2012 characterized EU response to the Arab uprisings. According to Bigo, “border
externalization refers to a fundamental change in the scales and operations of border institutions,
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shifting bordering practices from what Raeymaekers (2014:168) has recently referred to as the
‘stable ground of national checkpoints and territorial lines on maps to make them part of a more
fluid landscape built on overlapping, and often contradictory, histories of mobility and
exchange’” (Guild & Bigo, 2010, p. 252). There was an increased focus on the clandestine, ways
of deterring such mobility through the externalization of border control and on readmission by
origin and sending countries of those caught inside and near EU borders. While the
externalization of EU border control is not a new concept, the level of investment and intensity
of these efforts became significant and a major feature of EU policy transfers to foreign states, an
example of this is the EU-Turkey deal. Migration management outsourcing relationships have
appeared all over the southern Mediterranean between the EU and Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and
also Egypt.

Adoption of EU discourse in Egypt

In Egypt across the migration discourse, we see an adoption of European securitization
discourse- in addition to endogenous securitization discourse. Both popular and official discourse
on irregular migration in Egypt often redeploys similar themes of EU securitization discourse,
gravely warning against movement across the Mediterranean.
In an editorial in the state newspaper Al Ahram, the author writes in a piece titled “The
Nightmare of Illegal Migration,” that “countries such as Egypt are facing the flood of illegal
immigrants, fleeing the burning wars and the misery of reality in failed states. The developments
of the events show how the rising phenomenon of migration is putting pressure on the economic,
social and security situation in transit countries such as Egypt and receiving countries such as
Europe” (Al-Ahram, 2016). The editorial goes on calling on regional and international
cooperation “to address the serious aspects of the most dangerous phenomenon in the twentyfirst century.” In a piece for El Watan news, Jamal Taha upholds the positions for European
border controls stating, “The European Union has been suffering from the influx of refugees, the
infiltration of terrorist elements, which gave the problem a serious security dimension, which
explains the severity of the reaction. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
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confirmed that the number of migrants on average on their way to Europe rose 30 times more
than in 2014, 2015/2016” (2016).

We often see throughout opinion pieces in the Egyptian press the same speech of calling for
increased security measures to combat the danger of unauthorized migration as I have mentioned
earlier in the chapter. Similar to the European context, this often takes shape in the form of
humanitarian discourse, like that of awareness language described in chapter two. As mentioned
throughout this research, clandestine travel is often discursively associated with threats of
terrorism and crime, a process that mirrors EU discursive themes. Criminalizing the smuggler, as
discussed in the Egyptian context above, is a central migration-security concept that is reinforced
in European political discourse as well. As Tazzioli states of the political hyper-focus on the
criminality of smuggler or trafficker: “One consequence of this is that the reframing of the
debate around migrant deaths at sea has lowered the level of critique of a contemporary politics
of migration more generally: the fight against smugglers has become the unquestioned and
unyielding point of agreement, supported across more or less the entire European political arena”
(2018, p. 6).

By identifying the similarities of these discourses, we can witness how the prospect of the
freedom of mobility across borders is equally as threatening and dangerous requiring unlimited
efforts to combat it for both the nation states of the global north and south. Indeed, several
scholars have polemicized explanations as to why mobile subjects are perceived to be such a
danger. For example, in her book Walled States, Waning Sovereignty Wendy Brown argues that
mobility and the idea of freedom of movement is a threat to a country’s sovereignty, and the
effect of this is exemplified by intensified fortification of border control measures (Brown,
2010). Brown examines wall-building and strengthened border regimes in both the global north
and the south under the precarious conditions of global capitalism. The anxiety over “waning”
national identity and sovereignty is projected unto borders and the material structures and
technologies that are invested in to secure them, according to Brown.

Critical discourse analysis calls on us to examine the discourse as a part of a dialectic, meaning
one must analyze the discourse in relation to a particular conditions or in this case, a moment. As
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mentioned previously, in order to analyze the Egyptian discourse on irregular migration
critically, it becomes important to situate it and put it into perspective with wider more dominant
EU securitization discourse. One must examine the connections and the interests served in
driving a particular framing of the Rasheed shipwreck and the migrant issue in Egypt and
highlight the ways in which it correlates and supports Europe’s border and deportation regime. In
order to do this, one must take account the role of the relationship between the EU and Egypt.
The EU is Egypt’s largest regional trading partner and Italy is Egypt’s largest trading partner
within the EU and the third largest internationally following the United States and China. The
strength of economic ties between the two countries on opposite sides of the Mediterranean
should be taken into serious consideration when analyzing the material reality of Egyptian state
discourse. Several EU states comprise Egypt’s top importers and exporters. Highlighting the
relationship between Egypt and Italy becomes particularly crucial for a comprehensive
understanding of the conditions the discourse this thesis is concerned with emanates from or
works in relation to. In 2016, Egypt sold Italy $1.47 billion dollars in export and bought $3.42
billion dollars in Italian imports, making Italian state Egypt’s top three economic trade partners
(Bloomberg, 2017). Business ties that generate around six billion dollars’ worth of profit for
various industries on either side of the Mediterranean prove to be crucial to maintain, at any
human cost. This is witnessed at sea and on land. For example, despite incidents that would have
otherwise threatened to disrupt the robust Egyptian-Italian diplomatic relationship, like the
murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni in Cairo in 2016, capital exchanges prove to be far
too crucial to risk.

Within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the main financial
instrument of the European Commission is the European Neighbourhood Instrument which
allows for direct funding from the EU to Egyptian governmental bodies. Between 2014 and 2016
a total between 311 and 380 million euros have been allocated to support various economic,
development, and migration projects (The European Union Delegation to Egypt, 2017). In June
2016, under the EU Trust Fund for North Africa, the project of “Enhancing the Response to
Migration Challenges in Egypt” was formulated. This initiative consists of EU funding in the
form of a 60 million Euro grant to address “the root causes of irregular migration” (EPSC
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Strategic Notes, 2017). Additionally, the Egyptian government recently signed three new
financing agreements for “strategic investment projects” with 46 million euros in grants;
“leveraging almost €600 million in soft loans from European Financial Institutions” (Egypt
Today, 2017). Even prior to the establishment of the European Trust Fund, initiatives financed
by the EU and/or member states, especially Italy, were prolific. This supports the argument that
in addition to endogenous reasons, the role of external actors like the EU serves as an additional
cause for the adoption by Egypt of official discourse on irregular migration across the
Mediterranean.

Demonstrating this link is important when we begin to understand from where the Egyptian
discourse draws upon and supports as such productions of knowledge do not come from a
vacuum. Indeed, similarities across EU securitization discourse and Egyptian discourse on the
securitization and criminalization of irregular migration is not a coincidence; the Egyptian state’s
many economic ties to Europe (the EU is Egypt’s largest trading partner) all but ensures its
cooperation and commitment with the EU in protecting the shores of Fortress Europe,
symbolically and politically. We must understand the link of similarities in securitization
discourse within the relationship of countless bilateral agreements of externalization involve
heavy financing from the EU to Egypt.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted the dominate themes of securitization that have characterized
the Egyptian discourse on irregular migration. Applying securitization theory and critical
discourse analysis, the link between discursive practices and the enforcement of security
measures have been examined. The strong representation of security and threat in framing issues
of migration in Egypt are derived from both an endogenous politics of security and draw upon
and are influenced by broader hegemonic migration-security discourse of the global north,
particularly in the context of the post-Arab Spring era. In order to demonstrate this link, I first
explain the crisis language and imagery of sea spectacles in relation to increasingly restrictive
EU border control measures. After describing this relationship, I explain how Egyptian powers
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also utilize similar discursive means that help to maintain EU political positions on irregular
migration. In order to elaborate on the power dynamics behind the discursive commonalities in
shaping the perception of irregular migration, the deep economic ties and funding between Egypt
and the EU are discussed.
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THESIS CONCLUSION
This thesis has identified prevailing themes that comprise the discourse of Egyptians who leave
Egypt and cross the Mediterranean through unauthorized means in hopes of better opportunities
in Europe. By engaging Egyptian media, official statements, and cultural production throughout
the thesis, I have discerned and traced the roots of the production of common narratives featured
regarding this issue, and analyzed their predominance and the purposes these themes serve in
connection to the state and wider hegemonic discourse using critical discourse analysis tools.

This research has explained how the Egyptian migrant, particularly in the wake of the Rasheed
incident, has been constructed and how the issue of Egyptians crossing the sea to Europe has
been framed in Egyptian public discourse. Based on the data collected in this thesis, a few major
thematic patterns were observed by the researcher. First, blame was regularly placed on
individuals who migrate and their parents for sea tragedies. Victims and survivors of the Rasheed
incident were routinely depicted as bringing such consequences upon themselves. Writers, talk
show hosts, and public officials frequently denied unemployment as a “real” reason for
emigration, instead associating the migrant with being lazy and wanting a quick way out. Often,
those who embark on such a journey were chided for not only risking their lives boarding “death
boats,” but also for spending a large sum of money to do so, becoming both foolish and selfish
figures. Entrepreneurship was lauded as a solution to the social ills where these individuals were
encouraged to invest their money in a local business venture instead.

Additionally, it was found that government discourse was predominantly echoed in media outlets
and cultural production. State narratives were channeled in the public discourses due to the
hegemonic nature of state institutions and social actors to produce a particular kind of knowledge
of the Egyptian irregular migrant. In these narratives, the chance to understand the migrant as a
rational actor with agency and this phenomenon in its complexities is dismissed. Furthermore,
the economic origins that fuel this type of mobility is also downplayed in these representations.
In order to refute the common sentiments that deny worsening socio-economic conditions to
protect the state from accountability, I reviewed current poverty levels, increase of prices, and
labor market dynamics that illustrate the magnitude of unemployment and underemployment.
This is particularly relevant since the link between migration and labor is strong- people move to
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find work and opportunities, but due to the restrictions of travel imposed on many of the global
south, irregular migration often becomes the only possibility.

Notions of nationalist imaginaries played a role in answering to the Rasheed tragedy and the idea
of Egyptian irregular migration generally. This was featured most prominently in the language of
government actors, such as the president who often invoked themes of a protective homeland
that both needs its children and refuses to forsake them. Patriotism as a discursive device was
employed frequently as a way of both encouraging people to work and endure in their home
country, and to also shame those who leave in precarious ways- here the figure of the migrant
becomes a traitor.

Throughout text and speech, the irregular movement of Egyptians to Europe was almost always
presented as a problem that needed a solution. Usually the presented solution was either
increased awareness initiatives, usually funded by international organizations, or securitization
measures. Calls for awareness of the risks involved in this type of migration were prominent in
the discourse, by media personalities and government and NGO actors alike. I demonstrated how
this rhetoric, which assumes that this decision taken by migrants to cross the sea is based in
ignorance, is problematic in that it is classist and denies the agency and knowledge that these
individuals possess on the risks involved. Additionally, the victimizing ethos that is characteristic
of awareness discourse works within a criminalizing paradigm- if the migrant is a helpless victim
then there must be a culprit to be blamed for tragedies that occur, that figure becomes the
smuggler.

In chapter four, I problematize the category of the smuggler and criminalization of migration
rhetoric, relating it to wider securitization discourse. The links between these discursive practices
and the creation and enforcement of new security measures such as the anti-smuggler law were
examined. I discussed the representational role that sea spectacles, such as the Rasheed sinking,
play in driving crisis language for political means to fortify border control regimes. The ways in
which Egyptian discourse on migration mirrors that of the global North were questioned and
contextualized by assessing the deep financial ties between Egypt and the EU that help drive
such policies and perceptions.
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There are several ways in which this research could be further expanded. One avenue to be
investigated is the question of the migrant and processes of victimization and re-victimization.
Due to the limits of this thesis and the safety and accessibility constraints, the researcher was
unable to conduct interviews of current/former/aspiring Egyptian irregular cross-Mediterranean
migrants. Research on this particular issue would be significantly enriched by including the
voices of these individuals. Although migrant testimonials were included in this thesis from
secondary interviews, a deeper understanding of the rejection of state discourse and its ultimate
failure could be gained by incorporating and highlighting their voices and logic. Emphasizing
only state discourse of this phenomenon runs the risk of potentially re-victimizing the migrant by
ignoring other types of representations. It is important to note that state discourse is not alldominant. Another discourse that should be explored further using such interviews would be the
construction of the migrant subject as hero, that is one who migrates and succeeds in life. In
fact, there is a disparity between what the state says on this topic and the continuing practice of
this type of movement, suggesting that this construction is particularly important for these
individuals. However, due to this thesis’s limits in space and time, the researcher chose to focus
on the perception and construction of the migrant in the public sphere and how it relates to the
ways in which hegemonic powers conceive of their relationship between the state, society and
the individual.

In conclusion, identifying, analyzing, and problematizing the construction of the Egyptian
irregular migrant subject, as I have done in this research, offers a lens in understanding the
dynamics of the issue of unauthorized mobility through its representational prisms. Most
importantly, I observed that the discourse operates in a way that limits or eliminates possibilities
for a politics of freedom of movement to be discussed or be put into conversation. Dominant
narrative productions fail to highlight the fundamental role of unjust, discriminatory and violent
border control regimes for the prevalence of risky irregular migration and do not call for their
transformation. This is because unauthorized movement that subverts border regimes of
regulation is a threatening concept for the nation-state. Therefore, the individual who participates
in such “trespass” becomes a site of insecurity, unsettling the state’s demands for population
control, igniting more restrictive securitization measures to counter such “flows.” This
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contentious and violent relationship between government and individuals on the move can be
observed by unpacking the discourse. Whether it is framed in clear securitization terms or hidden
within the language of humanitarianism, as I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the
hegemonic will of containment policies are enforced.
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